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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 40985
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN

ED GUERRICABEITIA

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 6/11/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 10:28 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Juqge: Michael Mclaughlin
Defendant: Nicolescu, Kevin Michael

State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu
Date

Code

User

10/25/2011

NCRM

TCWADAMC

New Case Filed - Misdemeanor
[Citation issued 10/15/11]

Magistrate Court Clerk

PROS

TCWADAMC

Prosecutor assigned Boise City ProsecutorGeneric

Magistrate Court Clerk

APNG

TCLANGAJ

Appear & Plead Not Guilty/Guerricabeitia

Magistrate Court Clerk

RQDD

TCLAI\JGAJ

Defendant's Request for Discovery

Magistrate Court Clerk

RQDD

TCLANGAJ

Defendant's Request for Discovery
[duplicate entry]

Magistrate Court Clerk

MOTN

TCLAI\JGAJ

Motion for Extension for Filing Pretrial Motions

Magistrate Court Clerk

CHGA

TCTURNJM

Judge Change: Administrative

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCTURNJM

Hearing Scheduled (BC Pretrial Conference
12/19/2011 02:15PM)

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCTURN.IM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/13/2012 08:15 John Hawley Jr.
AM)

TCTURNJM

Notice of Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

10/27/2011

10/28/2011

Judge

10/31/2011

RQDD

TCLANGAJ

Defendant's Request for Discovery/Second
Request

John Hawley Jr.

11/2/2011

HRSC

TCTORRGR

Hearing Scheduled (File Memo I Review
11/16/2011 08:30AM) pc

John Hawley Jr.

11/3/2011

ORDR

TCFINNDE

Order for Extension for Filing PT Motions

John Hawley Jr.

11/4/2011

RSDS

TCLAI\JGAJ

State/City Response to Discovery

John Hawley Jr.

RQDS

TCLANGAJ

State/City Request for Discovery

John Hawley Jr.

11/14/2011

RSDS

TCLANGAJ

State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental

John Hawley Jr.

11/16/2011

HRHD

TCMCCOSL

Hearing result for File Memo I Review scheduled John Hawley Jr.
on 11/16/2011 08:30AM: Hearing Held pc

CRCO

TCMCCOSL

Criminal Complaint

12/1/2011

RSDS

TCOLSOMC

State/City Response to Discovery I Supplemental John Hawley Jr.

12/2/2011

MOTN

TCOLSOMC

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence

John Hawley Jr.

MEMO

TCOLSOMC

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Suppress Evidence

John Hawley Jr.

12/5/2011

AFFD

TCTONGES

Affidavit of Kevin Michael Nicolescu in Support of John Hawley Jr.
Motion to Suppress Evidence

12/19/2011

HRVC

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
01/13/2012 08:15AM: Hearing Vacated

John Hawley Jr.

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for BC Pretrial Conference
scheduled on 12/19/2011 02:15PM: Hearing
Held- Set for Motion Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCFII\INDE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/14/2012 03:30
PM)

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Notice of Hearing
[file stamped 12/27/2011]

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Pretrial Memorandum

John Hawley Jr.

PTMM

John Hawley Jr.
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Date: 6/11/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 10:28 AM

ROA Report

Page 2 of 3

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin
Defendant Nicolescu, Kevin Michael

State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu
Date

Code

User

1/24/2012

STIP

TCTONGES

Stipulation to Continue Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence Scheduled on February 14,
2012

John Hawley Jr.

2/6/2012

ORDR

TCFINNDE

Order to Conitnue Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

CONT

TCFINNDE

Continued (Motion 04/13/2012 09:30AM)

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Notice of Hearing
[file stamped 02/08/2012]

John Hawley Jr.

Judge

4/6/2012

BREF

TCTONGES

Brief in Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc
Breath Test Results

John Hawley Jr.

4/13/2012

PTMM

TCFINNDE

Pretrial Memorandum

John Hawley Jr.

CONT

TCFINNDE

Continued (Motion 06/11/2012 03:30PM)

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Notice of Hearing
[file stamped 04/16/2012]

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Continued (Motion 07/05/2012 03:30PM)

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Notice of Hearing
[not located in file - possibly entered in error]

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Continued (Motion 07/02/2012 03:30PM)

John Hawley Jr.

TCFINNDE

Notice of Hearing
[file stamped 06/15/2012]

John Hawley Jr.

HRSC

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (BC Pretrial Conference
08/16/2012 08:15AM)

John Hawley Jr.

HRHD

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/02/2012 03:30PM: Hearing Held

John Hawley Jr.

7/25/2012

MEMO

TCFINNDE

Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to
Suppress

John Hawley Jr.

8/16/2012

HRVC

TCFINI\IDE

Hearing result for BC Pretrial Conference
scheduled on 08/16/2012 08:15AM: Hearing
Vacated

John Hawley Jr.

PTMM

TCWEGEKE

Pretrial Memorandum and Minute Entry

Michael McLaughlin

8/17/2012

HRSC

TCFINNDE

Hearing Scheduled (File Memo/Review
09/28/2012 03:00 PM)

John Hawley Jr.

8/29/2012

APDC

TCTONGES

Appeal Filed In District Court

John Hawley Jr.

CAAP

TCTONGES

Case Appealed:

John Hawley Jr.

CHGA

TCTONGES

Judge Change: Administrative

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

TCTONGES

Motion to Hold Matter in Aberyance Pending
Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

8/31/2012

NOTC

TCOLSOMC

Notice of Preparation of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

9/12/2012

OGAP

DCLYKEMA

Order Governing Procedure On Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

9/24/2012

ORDR

TCFINNDE

Order Holding Matter in Abeyance Pending
Appeal

John Hawley Jr.

HRVC

TCFINNDE

Hearing result for File Memo/Review scheduled
on 09/28/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing VacatedAppeal filed

John Hawley Jr.

LDGD

TCTONGES

Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript

6/11/2012

6/14/2012

7/2/2012

10/2/2012

CONT

CONT
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Kathryn A. Sticklen

Date: 6/11/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 10:28 AM

ROA Report

P<:1ge 3 of 3

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin
Defendant: Nicolescu, Kevin Michael

State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu
Date

Code

User

10/26/2012

TRAN

DCCHESBD

Transcript Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

NOFG

DCCHESBD

Notice Of Filing of Transcript

Michael Mclaughlin

11/28/2012

BREF

TCCHRIKE

Appellant's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

12/21/2012

BREF

TCTONGES

Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

1/10/2013

BREF

TCTONGES

Reply Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

1/23/2013

NOHG

TCTONGES

Notice Of Hearing

Kathryn A. Sticklen

HRSC

TCTONGES

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/20/2013 01 :00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOHG

TCTONGES

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Kathryn A. Sticklen

HRSC

TCTONGES

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
04/03/2013 01:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

2/20/2013

HRVC

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 02/20/2013 01:00PM: Hearing Vacated

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/22/2013

CHGA

TCLYCAAM

Judge Change: Administrative

Michael Mclaughlin

4/3/2013

DCHH

TCLYCAAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 04/03/2013 01:00PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100

Michael Mclaughlin

4/9/2013

STIP

TCFINNDE

Stipulation to Supplement Evidence in
Suppression Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

ORDR

TCFINNDE

Order Supplementing Evidence in Suppression
Hearing

John Hawley Jr.

STJP

TCFINNDE

Stipulation Augmenting the Record on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

TCLYCAAM

Order Augmenting the Record on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

TCLYCAAM

Memorandum Decision and Order- Motion to
Supress is Reversed

Michael Mclaughlin

APSC

TCTONGES

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 40985

Michael Mclaughlin

1/25/2013

4/16/2013

5/3/2013

6/11/2013

Judge
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BOISE POLICE DEPT.
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION
~f:-;.4
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
4TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF .·
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
ADA
/
STATE OF IDAHO
COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS
0 Infraction Citation
vs.
~ Misdemeanor Citation

;)

o:::::::t"

~

NIC-aC~SC-1..(

o.::::t

0Accident Involved
0 Commercial Vehicle
Driven by this Driver

Last Name

~

';!::.~'!

VIN#

1'
""'~); I D><.,.t.:o:>o<.~
[AI(,SP /1 Y'2 ~~~'1 l"b' USDOTTKCensus#_ _ _ _ _ __

0
0 GVWR 26001 + 0 16 + Pe?s 0
~Operator

0

Class A

0

Class B

~Class D 0 Other_ _ _ _ _ __
Placard Haz~ous Materials IPUC# _ _ _ __
Class C

Home Address
! Vt:J(S.e
X'o ~7D3
Business Address
Ph #
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS:
ltY DL 0 10 0 V I certify I have reasonable grounds, and believe the above-named Defendant,
DL or SS#
r
Stat~.O
Sex:
~
F
Height ft, '0
Wt. //PO
Hair '81(1.1 Eyes S,e.N
DOB
Veh. Lie.#
. State
Yr. of Vehicle ;49~

MJ

JZ.o

0

Color ~6.LL::.!:.. v~---at t?Z.-12..
.4
M.

7
o·croCk
Vio.#1
~~~~~~~~~~~--------------'~~-'-~~~=
e, /!...f't {_Code Section
1'1I '!JS

Make

S E"

ll

Vio. #2

Code Section

"Xt>ltlfa / I" /H
Hwy. .,.---,---~---- Mp._______ __A~D"-A'--_County, Idaho.
(/)
f,r;
PAl-IC~5~
Audio
V"ldeo
-- - - - -=L.---LJ-t,=-:.-=---------.=:;.:::"-,-rL,--,..-----~0 YLI'til!POUCEDEPT.

Location

Itt

Date'

•

Officer/Party

Serial #/Address
t..(33
JS!!p
Dater
Witnessing Officer
Serial #/Address
Dept.
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the
District Court of
ADA
County,
BOISE
, Idaho,
located at
200 W. FRONT STREET
on or after
l
~
20 _jJ__,

(!Jf,t£/tt

fl/0/)k:£

t>)

CI

but on or before

/'-(

, 20

I1

, at 8 A.M.-4

o'clock ~M.

,

I acknO\~dge<mx:eiP.ttJ>f this summons and I promise to appear at the time indicated.
p?

0

g

:J

m

0

$E'~v~""'7

Defendant's Signature

m
I hereb~rtifyC~;~~rviC'e"upon the defend::rersonally on
g
·~ ;
~!1.L-- ~~$""~
t...:J

!0/n::;--

,20 """''--''--

1!2.
:...
.,
Officer
NOTICEtSee reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.

COURT COPY VIOLATION #1

( { -l7o7f,
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NO.•

~

..

A.M~

_meo~JJ
_:;_;;._=j-+--

~P.M ......

OCT 2 7 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
Attorneys at Law
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
Citation No.: 1484104

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY
OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND
FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL; AND
DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of record,
Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and pursuant
to Rule 6(d), of the Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, hereby enters his appearance and his
plea of not guilty to each and every charge in the above-entitled matter.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL;
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 1

000006

.

,.

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 13
of the Constitution of the State of Idaho; and Idaho Code, Section 19-3501, Defendant
respectfully demands a speedy jury trial.
Pursuant to Rule 3(d), Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, Defendant respectfully
demands that a sworn complaint be filed for each offense charged by uniform citation in the
above-entitled action.
All future pleadings, correspondence and other documents relating to this matter should
be forwarded to Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm of Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, as attorney
for Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, at the above-referenced address.
DATED this Jl!day of October, 2011.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL;
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 2

000007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ..71-Aday of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:

Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[v(

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL;
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 3

000008

AM

FILED~

OCT 2 7 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
Attorneys at Law
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
(208) 386-9428
Facsimile:
ISB No. 6148

By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
Citation No.: 1484104

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF

,
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his counsel, and
pursuant to I.C.R. 16, hereby requests discovery and inspection of all materials discoverable per
I.C.R. 16 b (1-8), including but not limited to, the following:
1.

Statement of the Defendant.

-

----P.M.~-.-.=-~--~

Copies of any and all statements and/or

communications made by the Defendant, whether oral, written or otherwise, to any law
enforcement agent, prosecutor, official, or anyone involved with or connected to the
investigation or prosecution of this case, the existence of which is known or which is
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 1

000009

available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence, and all formal and
informal notes related to such statements or communications, and also the substance of
any relevant or oral statement made by the Defendant - whether before or after arrest - to
a peace officer, prosecuting attorney or his agent, and the recorded testimony of the
Defendant before a Grand Jury which relates to the offense charged.
2.

Statement of Co-Defendant.

Any written or recorded statements by a co-

Defendant, and the substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-Defendant
whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the coDefendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney.
3.

Defendant's prior record.

A copy of the Defendant's entire prior criminal

record, if any, as is then or may become available to the prosecuting attorney, and a
description, summary and/or listing of any or all "bad acts" or occurrences the
prosecution intends to introduce against the Defendant or that the prosecution may use
against any witness or co-defendant for purposes of cross-examination or as rebuttal to
character evidence introduced by Defendant or by his/her witnesses.
4.

Documents and tangible objects. Books, papers, documents, audio or video

recordings, photographs, blood, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are
intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, or obtained from or belonging to
the Defendant, with a chain of custody record for each such item, pursuant to Rule
16(b)(4).
5.

Video or audio recordings. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy any and

all video or audio recordings which are in the possession, custody or control of the State,
of any conversations between the Defendant, or co-Defendant and any agent of the State.
Without limiting the foregoing, the Defendant requests copies of the following records:
A.

All audio and/or video recordings in connection with this matter.

B.

A copy of the log sheet for the breath or blood testing device or

laboratory used to test the Defendant's blood alcohol content, which log sheet
should reflect all tests conducted on the same date as the Defendant was tested or
his blood was analyzed.
C.

A copy of the calibration certificates for the breath or blood testing device

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -2

000010

or techniques used to administer an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration to
the Defendant for the period commencing at least six months prior to the
Defendant's arrest and continuing to the date of trial.
D.

A copy of any current certificate or record indicating that the individual

who administered the breath test to the Defendant, or analyzed the Defendant's
blood is qualified to conduct said test or analysis.
E.

A copy of any record available indicating the extent of the training and

experience in breath or blood testing of the individual who administered the
breath or blood test to the Defendant, with regard to the specific instrument or
technique used to administer or analyze the test.
F.

A copy of any record available indicating the extent of the training and

experience of the individual who actually drew any blood from the Defendant.
G.

A copy of any record or report indicating the technique or method used to

draw any blood from the Defendant.
H.

A copy of the manual of procedures governing the administration of

breath or blood tests at the facility where the Defendant was tested or his blood
was analyzed.
I.

The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the machine used to

test the Defendant's blood alcohol, during the three months prior to the testing of
the Defendant, and the nature of any such repairs or maintenance.
J.

The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the machine used to

test the Defendant's blood alcohol, from the date of testing of the Defendant up to
the date of trial, and the nature of such repairs or maintenance.
K.

A copy of the operator's manual for the machine used to test the

Defendant's breath or blood and the date and test of all additions, deletions,
modifications or changes made to the operator's manual.
L.

The number of times within the last two years that the machine used to test

the Defendant's breath or blood has been tested to determine its ability to detect
acetone or other "interferents," and the results of any such tests.
M.

A copy of any repair or maintenance log kept with regard to the machine

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -3

000011

which was used to test the Defendant's breath or blood.
N.

A current copy of any and all regulations adopted by the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare or Department of Law Enforcement with
regard to the conduct of forensic alcohol examinations or with regard to quality
control and proficiency testing at clinical laboratories.
0.

Provide a written copy of the dispatcher's radio log and all other logs

which indicate the time of the stop of the Defendant and time of arrival at the jail,
to include but not limited to the C.C.R. log pertaining to the arrival of the
Defendant.
6.

Reports of examinations and tests. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or

photograph any results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific
tests or experiments made in connections with this particular case, or copies thereof,
which are intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, pursuant to Rule
16(b)(5). Without limiting the foregoing, Defendant requests copies of the following
specific tests:
A.

A copy of the print-out from the last breath test prior to Defendant's

wherein acetone or any other "interferent" was detected by the breath analysis
machine.
B.

A copy of the print-outs from the seven breath tests administered prior to

the test administered to the Defendant.
C.

The results of any test conducted by any agent of the State of Idaho or any

other governmental entity to determine the effect of radio frequency interference
(RFI) on the machine used to analyze the blood or breath of the Defendant.
D.

The results of any test conducted by the manufacturer of the machine used

to test the Defendant's breath or blood to determine its susceptibility to distortion
of results by radio frequency interference (RFI).
E.

A copy of all proficiency test results or on-site evaluation studies

conducted with regard to the facility at which the Defendant's breath or blood was
tested and such results for the individual who conducted the test of the
Defendant's blood alcohol content during the period commencing one year prior
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 4

000012

..
to the Defendant's arrest and continuing to the date of trial.
F.
7.

Any and all lab reports.

State witnesses. A written list of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of

all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the prosecuting
attorney as witnesses at trial, together with any record of prior felony convictions of any
such person, and copies of any and all statements, whether oral, written or otherwise,
made by the prosecution's witnesses, or prospective witnesses, to the prosecuting attorney
or his agents, or to any law enforcement agent or official involved in the investigation of
the case and a summary of each witness's prospective testimony, pursuant to Rule
16(b)(6).
8.

Police and Dispatch reports. All reports, memoranda, notes, audio and/or video

recordings, cell phone records, dispatch transcripts, and dispatch audio made by any law
enforcement agent in the investigation or the prosecution of this case and involving
Defendant or any other witness or person involved in this case.
9.

Jail Records. Copies of all jail records for the Defendant, included but not

limited to booking slips, cell-mate records, and any other reports, memoranda or records
made in connection with the booking process related to this case, surety or bond records
and personal property records for the Defendant.

Also, copies of any recorded

conversations, whether oral, written or otherwise, between the Defendant and any third
person while Defendant was incarcerated or held at any detention facility.
10.

Immigration Materials. If there was or is an immigration hold on Defendant,

copies of any immigration holds, any and all records, notes, logs or communications with
the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of Homeland
Security, ICE, or other state or federal government agencies, agents, or any other
individual regarding the immigration status of Defendant, copies of each agreement and
contract the jail, city, county or state has with Immigration or Homeland Security
regarding funding and inmates, copies of any detention policies and procedures regarding
immigration and immigration holds and inmates.
11.

Experts. The underlying facts or data that form the basis of any expert testimony

pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 705.
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 5
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\

'

12.

SOP Manual. The specific Standard Operating Procedures Manual the office~(s)

followed when administering any field sobriety tests or blood alcohol tests.
13.

Brady Material. All exculpatory evidence favorable to the Defendant which is

material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The Defendant further requests this information, evidence and material, or permission to
inspect and copy the information, evidence and materials, within FOURTEEN (14) days, unless
it is given sooner at the offices of Davison, Copple, Copple, & Copple, 199 North Capitol
Boulevard, Suite 600, Boise, Idaho.
The Defendant reserves the right to make request for such other and additional discovery
as may be determined at a later date.
DATED this

A

)1

day of October, 2011.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 6
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'

'

.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.#..

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :2~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:

Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[v(
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia
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NO.:---""Cil'l;~~.,q..J_J__

1

A.M __--FIL~[;&1>:z=~·

OCT 2 7 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri<
By AMY LANG
DEPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
Attorneys at Law
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
(208) 386-9428
Facsimile:
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
Citation No.: 1484104

MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR
FILING PTR-TRIAL MOTIONS

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of record,
Ed Guerricbaeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and moves
this Court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 1 and Rule 12(d), for its Order extending the
time for filing of pre-trial motions until twenty-eight (28) days following the State's complete
compliance with its discovery obligations. This Motion is based on the fact that the 28-day rule
of the Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 12(d) has generally been formulated to apply in the District
Court in felony cases after discovery has been fully completed in the Magistrate's Division. The
MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS -1
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.
requested extension of time will allow the parties time to complete discovery and thus determine
whether Rule 12 motions are needed in the above-entitled action.
DATEDthis

27

A.
dayof0ctober,2011.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:~~
citia)Ofthefu11
EdGUefrica
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

""

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2r_ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:

Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[·~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ]
[ ]

Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia

MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS -2
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L/:c:Jt

OCT 3 1 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
Attorneys at Law
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
(208) 386-9428
Facsimile:
ISB No. 6148

DI!PUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
Citation No.: 1484104

DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF

BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his counsel, and

pursuant to I.C.R. 16, hereby requests discovery and inspection of all materials discoverable per
I.C.R. 16 b (1-8), including but not limited to, the following:
1.

Reports of examinations and tests. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or

photograph any results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific
tests or experiments made in connections with this particular case, or copies thereof,
which are intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, pursuant to Rule
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 1
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16(b)(5). Without limiting the foregoing, Defendant requests copies of the following
specific tests:
A.

A copy of the print-out from the breath test submitted by Defendant and

administered by the Officer PRIOR to Defendant being played the advisory tape
which informed Defendant of his consequences for refusal or failure of any
evidentiary testing.
B.

A copy of the print-outs from the one (1) breath test administered prior to

the subsequent two (2) test administered to the Defendant.

2.

Brady Material. All exculpatory evidence favorable to the Defendant which is

material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The Defendant further requests this information, evidence and material, or permission to
inspect and copy the information, evidence and materials, within FOURTEEN (14) days, unless
it is given sooner at the offices of Davison, Copple, Copple, & Copple, 199 North Capitol
Boulevard, Suite 600, Boise, Idaho.
The Defendant reserves the right to make request for such other and additional discovery
as may be determined at a later date.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2011.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:

Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[vJ
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia

DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -3
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JUDICfRE,~'!fR1Cj1~ti~=£

IN. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU~'y OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
NOV 0 2 2011
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
ER RICH Clerk
0

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

)

Kevin Michael Nicolescu
1708 N 30th st
Boise, ID 83703

)
)
)
)
)

CHRISTO~HERIN PENA

)

y

'

DEPUTY

)

)

Defendant.

--------~~~~-------------------

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
BC Pretrial Conference ... Monday, December 19, 2011 ... 02:15 PM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
Jury Triai ... Friday, January 13, 2012 ... 08:15 AM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:
Hand Delivered ___
Mailed ____
Clerk ______ Date ____

Defendant:

Edward Joe Guerricabeitia
PO Box 1583
Boise ID 83701
Private Counsel: Mailed

X:. 1

Hand

l?Ef,lliiyy~er~_

Clerk~ Date J..l.l.Q.r

Prosecutor:

lnterdepwtrJJental Mail
Clet.J01V Date

Public Defender:

f

I'J(JLL 0 Ada}(Boise 0 Eagle 0 G.C. 0 Meridian

.:....;__:_:::::.....ot£?"-

Interdepartmental Mail ____
Clerk
Date _______

Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

· Mailed,___
Hand Delivered _ _
Clerk ______ Date _______

Dated: 10/28/2011

CHRISTOPH
Clerk of the

I
NOTICE OF HEARING

By:

--~-~~~--------

Deputy Clerk

000021

N°·---~F=·IL"'=~o-~~..,..;zv""'7"'::~
A.M._,....___

_.P.M._.U-

RECEIVED

NOV 0 3 2011

OCT 2 7 2011

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Ada County Clerk

By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
Citation No.: 1484104

ORDER FOR EXTENSION FOR
FILING PTR-TRIAL MOTIONS

Based upon the Motion filed herewith and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the time for filing pre-trial motions has been
extended to twenty-eight (28) days following the filing of the State's Response to Defendant's
Request for Discovery.
DATED this Q_ day of

N/) c/

2011.

ORDER FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS - 1
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Ml
A.M·-----iP.M,-=:2_,
......__:

NOV 04 ·2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUTY

C:ARYB. COLAIANNI
BOIS~~F~TY AJTORNEY
Sarah rlflt'·'
.A. Millar .·_
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. B6x 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

COMES NOW, the state ofldaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City
Attorney, and submits the following Response to Request for Discovery:
· · The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following information,
.

-

eviden~e,.and materials with the exception of witness and victim dates of birth, driver's license

numbers and/or social security numbers:

: '

~~p~r::

.

1. Copies of:

L

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Calibration for Instrument Serial No.
#90205665
~ertificate of Analysis/Approval for Solution Lot #10802 and 10103
Boise Police Department Officer Certification Records for the Intoxilyzer 5000 series
or Lifeloc FC20

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1
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!daho J:?rivers License Record(s)
· DUI General Report DR# 125-026
. Boise Police Department General Report DR# 125-026
Boise Police Department Supplemental Report DR# 125-026 by Officer Palic
Crime Scene Investigation Photo Log(s)
Idaho Vehicle Collision Report. No. 125-026
Lifeloc Technologies, Inc. test result(s)
Boise Police Department Idaho Uniform Citation# 1484104
NCIC-KQ
2. Defendant advised of existence and allowed access to when available (for audio or
video tapes, see paragraph #7):
Intox 5000 series Instrument or Lifeloc FC20 Operations Log for Serial Number
' 202056.65
Audio Tape and/or Digital Audio Recording(s)
-~= Ada County Dispatch Digital and/or Audio Recording
Computer Aided Dispatch Report
Photocopy ofphotograph(s)
3. Results of examination and tests:
Intoxilyzer Results: .1 03/.096
4. The State intends to call as witnesses:
Idaho State Police Forensic Lab Representative, PO Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680
(208) 884-7170
Rachel Cutler and/or Designee, Idaho State Police Forensic,Lab Representative, PO
Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680 (208) 884-7170
.. Cpl. L¥fY G. Moore Ada #433, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place,
Boise, ID 83704, (208) 570-6000
·
~·Representative from
Ada County Paramedics, PO Box 140209, Boise, ID 83714,
-~'(208) 287-2962
Greg Warner or designee, Ada County Sheriffs Office, Dispatch, 7200 Barrister, Boise,
ID 83704, (208) 577-6790
'
Officer Josiah C. Ransom Ada #797, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall
Place, Boise, ID 83 704, (208) 570-6000
Officer Nic Ellis Ada #836, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, Boise,
ID 83704, (208) 570-6000
Officer Jones, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, Boise, ID 83704,
(208) 570-6000
Representative of St. Alphonsus, 1055 N. Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83704, (208) 3643221
.
Amanda Stacey Carlson, 4612 E Faith Ln, Boise, ID 83706, (208) 713-3470
_ . Officer Chris Palic Ada #858, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place,
· ·;,.:Boise, :iD 83704, (208) 570-6000
_ Karin Lynn Raffo, 207 North 4th Street, Boise, ID 83702, (208) 890-0595
':>;!} •
.. .,... ...,.#:\~'

.

RESPQNSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 2
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Ismat Ahmadi, 110 E. 35th Street, Boise, ID 83714, (208) 908-1369
Paul H. Davis, 5952 South Red Crest Avenue, Boise, ID 83704, no phone number
available
James F. Pollard, 705 Locust Street, Kimberly, ID 83341, (208) 293-2649
Brian J. Avila, 10453 West Bear Lake Drive, Boise, ID 83709, (208) 539-5648
And any other individuals identified in the discovery materials.
5. The Idaho criminal history for Defendant and/or witness~s, if such history exists, can
be found using the on-line Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository at:
https://www.idcourt. us
..

6. There may be other relevant information or documents on this case contained in the
Court file.
7. If the citation and/or police report reflect the existence of audio or video recording(s),
please email a request to BCAO@cityofboise.org including the case number and the
name of the defendant OR contact the legal secretary for the undersigned to make
arrangements to do one of the following:
a) Have the digital audio tape sent electronically to a secure FTP program for
you to download to your local machine. You will be notified via email when
it is ready to download;
b) Listen and/or view the audiotape, videotape, and/9r CD at the Boise City
Attorney's office;
c) Make or obtain a copy of the audio file, video file or compact disc at our
office using our high-speed dubbing machine or downloading the file to a CD
or USB drive.
8. Intoxilyzer 5000 series or Lifeloc FC20 Maintenance Log and Records:
a) Maintenance conducted on the instrument is noted on the Intox. 5000 series
Instrument Operations Log or Lifeloc FC20 Log; no separate maintenance log is
kept. All internal maintenance is reflected in a voluminous collection of
maintenance documents; copies of said maintenance documents are kept at the
"'
Boise
City Attorney's Office. Defense counsel may make arrangements to view
s~d copies by contacting the handling attorney in this case.
9. Documents Relating to the Intoxilyzer 5000 series Detecting Acetone or Other
Interfering Substances:
a) Please refer to the Idaho Intoxilyzer 5000 Series Reference Manual, pages 25 &
29 for relevant information. See below for how to obtain said manuals.
10. Intoxilyzer Manual and Lifeloc FC20 Manual:
a) Manuals relating to the Intoxilyzer and the Lifeloc FC20 may be obtained via
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 3
'ff
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)

the Internet at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensic/certificates.html#CofA
11. Certificate of Analysis for the Solution Lot:
a) The Certificate of Analysis for the Solution Lot may also be found on the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services website at:
http://www.isp.idaho. gov/forensic/certificates.html#CofA
b) For certificates that are not listed on the webpage, please contact Forensic
Services at P.O. Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680-0700,208-884-7219.
12. Alco-Sensor:
a)'No similar records are maintained on the hand-held Alco-Sensor because the
instrument is used merely to detect the presence of alcohol, not to obtain a
specific BAC.
13. Officer Certification and Training Records:
a) The list containing officer certification information is attached hereto. Defense
counsel may submit a specific written request to the POST Academy care of Trish
Christy, 700 S. Stratford Drive, Meridian, Idaho 83642 for information regarding
a specific officer's training history, including which year (color) of N.H.T.S.A.
training manual was used and if/when the officer may have taken a refresher
training. If counsel has questions regarding the request, they may contact Ms.
Christy at 208-884-7253.
14. The State recognizes its on-going duty to supplement this Response to Discovery
should additional evidence relevant to this case arise.
DATED this __3_ day ofNovember, 2011.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

_.3_ day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

X

INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER
US MAIL
ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com
funk@davisoncopple.com
aynmcmill~n@davisoncopple.com

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 5
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NDV 0~ .2011
CHRISTOPHER 0 Al
By MAURA OLSOCH, Cieri(
N

DEPUTy

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208} 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.
' 1

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

TO: E4, Guerricabeitia:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence and
materials:

1.

DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS -- Books, papers, documents,

photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession,
'

'

custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at
trial.

i

REPORTS OF EXAMINATION AND TESTS-- Any results or reports of physical

or ment,al. exami;:mtions and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this case,
or

copies
''(

:

thereof,

within

the

p6ssession

or

control

of

Defendant,

which

'

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1
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defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness
whom Defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the
witness.
3.

DEFENSE WITNESSES - Name(s), address(es), and phone number(s) of any

witnesses Defendant intends to call at trial.

· 4. EXPERT WITNESSES- Name(s), address(es), and phone number(s) of any expert
witness Defendant intends to call at trial. With respect to each expert witness, please provide a
written summary describing the testimony the witness intends to introduce, including the
witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.
The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said information,
evidence and materials prior to the 15th day of November, 2011, at a time and place mutually
agreeable to the parties hereto.
FURTHER, please take notice that the undersigned prosecutor, pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 19-519, demands the defendant to serve, within ten (10) days, upon the prosecutor, a
written notice of defendant's intention to offer alibi. Such notice shall state the specific place or
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.
YOU ARE FURTHER notified of the requirement to disclose any additional witnesses
promptly to the prosecutor named below as they become known to you.
DATED this ___3_ day ofNovember, 2011.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

__2_ day of November, 2011,

I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

'x.

INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER
US MAIL
ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com
funk@davisoncopple.com
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 3
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NO·-----;;;~--,.p-=-
FtLEo

A.M _ _ _ _ IP.M.,--"-~--

NOV 1 ~ 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ey ELAINE TONG
OI!PUTV

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

COMES NOW, the state of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City
Attorney, and submits the following Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery:
The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following additional
information, evidence, and/or materials:
Any copies of additional breath testing results have been requested and will be
forwarded via Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery when and if
received.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1
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..
DATED this ___j;Q_ day ofNovember, 2011.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

.lQ__ day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER
US MAIL
!
_.KELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com
funk@davisoncopple.com
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NO.

MD· 2011 •

CLERK

D. Finne&ID

DATE
PRosEcuToR

~ . Lw ~J._

.

Jf

I

J(e

t101lcz

I 2011

TOXIMETER - - - - - - - - - -

COMPLAINING W I T N E S S - - - - - - - - - -

TAPE NO.

HAWLEY IJ...-Jfo-/1

BEG8~3.E13
ENoBL/9..5-/

STATUS

JUDGE

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

BIETER
COMSTOCK
DAY
DENNARD
DUTCHER
GRANT
HANSEN

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

MCDANIEL

cia

MINDER

0
~
0
0

MORDEN
SCHMIDT
SWAIN.
VEHLOW
WATKINS

HAY

~

HAWLEY

0
0
0
0
0

P~ffi~.SWORN
PC FOUND
COMPLAINT SIGNED
AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED
NOPC FOUND
EXONERATE BOND
SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED
WARRANT ISSUED
BONO SET$
NO CONTACT

O.R. # - - - - - - - - -

0

DISMISS CASE

0

IN CUSTODY

COMMENTS
.

-----·- ------- ... - - - - - - - - - - - - -

· - - ·---PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

[REV 2·20011 ·
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•

No. _ _ _Fii:ED~~-

l

c' IV'
A()·

A.M._
FILED
·-----!P.M 2

NOV 1 6 201f
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk
By STORMY McCORMACK
DEPUTY

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Miliar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83 701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho Siate Bar No. 7439
IN;THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076'

COMPLAINT

-.

~

PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this

~ day of

N4 ~ ~\,t.N

' 2011,

--~=-·_.::....Le~o_"f'_;ll..=--rrl....:·_ _ _ _ _ _, Assistant City Attorney, in the city of Boise, county of
Ada, state of Idaho, who, being first duly s~orn, complains and says that Kevin Michael
Nicolescu, on or about the 15th day of October, 2011, in the city of Boise, county of Ada, and
state of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of:

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a misdemeanor, which is a violation of Idaho Code § 188004(1)(a), as follows~ to-wit:
COMPLAINT- 1

I

aw
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,

.
I

i

•

o

COUNT I
That the Defendant, Kevin Michael Niqolescu, on or about the 15th day of October, 2011,

in the city of Boise, county of Ada, state of Idaho, did unlawfully drive or be in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public, to-wit: 1996 Nissan, at or about Idaho and 16th, while under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs, and/or with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, as shown by analysis
of blood, urine, or breath, which is in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a).
All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute, and against the peace
and dignity of the state ofldaho.
Said Complainant therefore prays that the Defendant may be dealt with according to law.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

COMPLAINT- 2

.J..h_ day of_,_}J__y_c,t),e..._..;.r/
_ _, 2011.

aw
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: ._ _ _ _ALED_,>M

s

DEC 01 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUTY·

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
-THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

)

Defendant.

)

COMES NOW, the state of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City
Attorney, and submits the following Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery:
The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following additional
information, evidence, and/or materials:
1: Disclosure of:
Amended Complaint filed November 16,2011
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DATED this _8.o day of November, 2011.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~V day of November, 2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON,COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

k

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER
US MAIL
ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com
funk@davisoncopple.com
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 2

mas000037

DEC 02 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUlY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

***
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of
record Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and
moves this Court to suppress any and all evidence obtained by Officer Palic of the Boise Police
Department, in connection with the above captioned matter. Further, Defendant moves this
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Court to grant a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing. In support thereof, counsel sets forth the
following:
1.

On October 15, 2011, the Defendant was involved in an accident in which
he was hit by a driver running a red light at the intersection of Idaho and

16th streets in Boise, Idaho.
2.

Officer Palic noticed that the Defendant smelled of alcohol, Defendant's
eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and Defendant admitted to consuming
alcohol that night for which Officer Palic requested Defendant perform a
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test.

3.

Officer Palic was unable to complete the HGN test because Defendant's
left eye was bothering him and he felt like he had something in it. Officer
Palic elected not to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests.

4.

Officer Palic conducted a preliminary breath test on Mr. Nicolescu which
resulted in a reading of .108.

5.

Ther~fter,

influence.
6.

Officer placed Defendant under arrest for driving under the

AllRG-S~J> oe.. De.{A(I.)F:;-1> ?

After placing Defendant under arrest, Mr. Nicolescu performed two breath
tests of which the results were .103/.096.

7.

Officer Palic lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary
to arrest and request the Defendant to submit to evidentiary testing absent
the result of the preliminary breath test.

8.

The Defendant has a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the Motion to
Suppress evidence procured in violation of his constitutional rights.
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•

WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant this
Motion for full evidentiary hearing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Officer Palic's
lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Defendant to submit to any evidentiary testing
and subsequent arrest.
DATED this 2nd day ofDecember, 2011.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[v]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia
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DEC 02 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

***
COMES NOW Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his counsel of
record, Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple and hereby submits his
memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress.
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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 15, 2011, at approximately 2:12 a.m., Officer Palic of the Boise Police
Department responded to a car accident at the intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise.
Officer Palic made contact with Officer Ransom at the scene, who then directed him to Mr.
Nicolescu. Mr. Nicolescu explained to Officer Palic that as he approached the intersection
heading west with a green light he was hit by another driver from the north that ran a red light.
During the contact, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr.
~

.

Nicolescu as he spoke. Officer Palic also noticed that Mr. Nicolescu had glassy or..bloodshot
eyes, but that he was not slurring his speech, and that he did not show any signs of memory
impairment. When asked if he had consumed any alcohol, Mr. Nicolescu stated that he had
consumed alcohol that night.
At that point, Officer Palic asked Mr. Nicolescu to submit to a Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (HGN) test. Mr. Nicolescu complied and Officer Palic began to administer the test,
butthen h~d to stop the test because Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was bothering him from the debris
and dust that got into it from when the airbag deployed and hit his face. Officer Palic elected not
to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) due to the collision and adrenaline setting in.
'

However, in order to substantiate his probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr.
Nicolescu, Officer Palic took a preliminary breath test, which is not authorized by statute. The
preliminary breath test resulted in a reading of .108. Mr. Nicolescu was subsequently arrested
for driving under the influence. After his arrest, Mr. Nicolescu provided two breath samples, the
results ofwhich were .103/.096.
II.

ARGUMENT

The officer did not have the necessary probable cause or reasonable suspicion to request
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Mr. Nicolescu to submit to evidentiary testing to determine if he was driving under the influence

absent the result of the preliminary breath test. Moreover, it was improper for the officer to
require Mr. Nicolescu to submit to an evidentiary test (the preliminary breath test) in order to
substantiate his probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr. Nicolescu for driving under
the influence. Consequently, because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to have Mr. Nicolescu submit to any evidentiary testing prior to the preliminary breath test,
the results of the breath tests are the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights and should be suppressed.
In light of the above Defendant respectfully requests that this Court GRANT Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest Mr.
Nicolescu for driving under the influence prior to the results of the preliminary
evidentiary test, the results of the breath tests are the product of an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18

(1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007);DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711712, 184 P.3d at 217-18.
The issue of whether an officer can require an individual to submit to a preliminary
evidentiary test to substantiate probable cause or reasonable suspicion for an arrest is an issue of
first impression. It is unclear what the standard is for an officer's arrest and administration of
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evidentiary testing because the Courts in this state have yet to decide this issue.
Although Idaho Courts have yet to determine the proper standard, whether it is
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, for an officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test,
it appears that the standard for arrest and evidentiary testing is something more than reasonable
suspicion.
In Thompson v. State, 135 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho

Court of Appeals stated that it is not clear that probable cause is the correct standard for an
officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test, even though the defendant and the state
agreed that it was the applicable prerequisite. Because the higher standard of probable cause was
satisfied in this instance, the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue. Probable cause
existed here where the officer observed the defendant speeding, detected a strong odor of alcohol
on his breath, observed bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, was aware that the defendant refused
to take field sobriety tests, and had reason to believe the defendant lied when he stated that he
had not been drinking.

Collectively, these circumstances supported the officer's reasonable

belief that the defendant was driving while under the influence. Id
The Court of Appeals further stated in Thompson that its decision in State v. Ferreira,
133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), where it held that officers may administer field
sobriety tests based on reasonable suspicion, suggests that the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion may suffice for an officer's arrest and administering of evidentiary tests. Id. However,
field sobriety tests and evidentiary tests are not synonymous. An evidentiary test is the testing of
blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of intoxicating substances in a
person. I.C. § 18-8002A(e). Since the lesser standard applies to field sobriety tests, it appears
that something more than reasonable suspicion is required for an officer to arrest and administer
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evidentiary testing.
Probable cause is based on the totality ofthe circumstances. The Supreme Court of Idaho
has stated:

I

When reviewing an officer's actions the court must judge the facts against an objective
standard. That is, '\xould the :facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
search warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate." Because the facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed
from an objective standpoint, the officer's subjective beliefs concerning that
determination are not material.

State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996).
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982, P.2d 954, 959
(Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and "must
yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or
has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782
(Ct. App. 2004).
Generally, cases in Idaho that involve probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion to
perform field sobriety tests require more evidence that just the odor of alcohol, admission of
drinking or bloodshot eyes as evidence of alcohol or drug use. See State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho
137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the
defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, has glassy and bloodshot eyes,
seemed confused, and failed the field sobriety tests); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216
(Ct. App. 2008) (probable cause existed for arrest where defendant lost footing when exiting
vehicle, admitted to consuming alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests); State v. Zubizareta, 122
Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that probable cause existed to
arrest the defendant where the defendant had difficulty speaking and standing, he smelled of
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alcohol, he had watery eyes, urine-soaked trousers, an agitated attitude, and failed field sobriety
tests).
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a positive HGN test in conjunction
with other field sobriety tests may supply probable cause for arrest, but standing alone does not
provide proof positive of driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878,
811 P.2d 488 (1991); cf State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999)
(defendant failed HGN test, one-leg stand test, and heel-toe walking test).
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not have the requisite
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Mr. Nicolescu's arrest absent the results of the
preliminary breath test. Even if the officer only needed to satisfy the lesser standard, reasonable
suspicion, in order to arrest Mr. Nicolescu and administer evidentiary testing, the statute does not
authorize administering a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate probable cause to
arrest and administer more evidentiary tests. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause must exist
before an officer may arrest and administer evidentiary tests.

The officer here detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. Nicolescu's breath, and Mr.
Nicolescu admitted to drinking alcohol that night. Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech,
and did not show signs of impaired memory. The officer performed an HGN test on Mr.
Nicolescu but was unable to finish because Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were bothering him. Mr.
Nicolescu had just been in a collision accident, of which he was not at fault for, and debris had
gotten into his eyes which likely was the reason that Mr. Nicolescu's eyes appeared bloodshot to
the officer. The officer, not Mr. Nicolescu, elected not to continue performing the other field
sobriety tests. At this point, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
arrest Mr. Nicolescu. It was then that the officer administered the preliminary breath test, which
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is not authorized by statute.
Therefore, it appears that the officer improperly administered the preliminary breath test
for the sole purpose of substantiating his reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest Mr.
Nicolescu for driving under the influence.

To allow officers to administer a preliminary

evidentiary test in order to substantiate reasonable suspicion or probable cause would result in
reasonable suspicion or probable cause never being necessary in order to arrest and then
administer evidentiary testing. Officers, on mere hunches, suspecting an individual is operating
a vehicle under the influence could simply demand the individual to submit to a preliminary
breath test to form the officer's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Field Sobriety Tests
would be irrelevant, and if administered would result in biased observations of officers to
support an arrest.
The practice of administering a preliminary evidentiary test creates a slippery slope
between an individual's constitutional rights and the state's legitimate interest for the safety of
others, which practice can be fraught with abuse by officers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for arrest prior to the
preliminary breath test. Consequently, the results of the breath tests are the product of an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights and
should be suppressed.
The Defendant respectfully requests that this Court suppress any and all evidence derived
from the unconstitutional search and seizure.
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DATED this 2nd day ofDecember, 2011.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:

£{/~~~~

ED GUERRICABEITIA, ofthe firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[a/']
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

~~

Ed Guerricabeitia
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DEC -5 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
DSPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF ADA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN MICHAEL
NICOLESCU IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

)
) ss.
)

KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am over the age of 18 years old and make this Affidavit based upon my own personal
knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE1
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..
On October 15, 2011, I was driving my vehicle when I was involved in a car accident. I
was going through a green light at the intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Idaho, when
another driver heading the opposite direction ran a red light and collided with my vehicle. At the
time of the collision, my driver side airbag deployed and struck me in the face. The dust from
the deployment of my airbag got into my eyes.
An officer by the name of Palic approached me and started talking to me. The officer
asked if I had anything to drink, and I told him that I had consumed some alcohol that night. The
officer performed the eye test on me but was unable to finish because my eye was bothering me
from the debris and dust that got into it from when the airbag deployed and hit my face.
The officer decided not to perform any other Field Sobriety Tests on me, but gave me a
breath test. After he got the results from that first breath test he arrested me and then I performed
two more breath tests.
DATED this ~ay of December, 2011.

-

•
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before

e

is~ day o~~{ 'd-Q)l~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho /
My Commission Expires: \, (;l

I

( (o
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.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of December, 2011 I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[ vf
[ ]
[ ]

E

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

uerr1ca e1t1a
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DEC 1 9 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

- - =-J(p;.!.J. .e~v./.:. L.n__,jL-)/;.!.1..>("-'-1.4=J~M~~~~v!...:::..:l'.scy~--· ~

)
)

_________________________)
Defendant.

Appearances:
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Defense Counsel
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Case No.

(12-.11/J-c;}ol/- ool7of(,

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
AND MINUTE ENTRY

~hambers
Prosecutor

~/ kr

Interpreter---------

D

Jury trial waived and case is to be re-set for court trial.

D

Plea and sentence via Defense Counsel authorized by Defendant: Rule 6(d), IMR
and/or IIR.

D

Pre-trial motions, timely filed, are set for hearing o n - - - - - - - - - ' at

--,---- _ _.m.

D

Case is re-set for - - - - - - - - - - - - a t __________.m.

D

Defendant failed to appear. Absence not explained, justified, or excused.
Trial date vacated. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued.
Bond set at$_ _.,---_______

~

Other:

,W J/uf;~(l fa

S:ppleSS
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Oete11~r
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Dated this

/Cj .A

day of

0

Defendant
Address:

Telephone: --::=------------Clerk:

DE
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[Rev 11-2010]
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT&(; Tfif'
2011
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
By ANNA MORGAN
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

DEPUTY

)

)

Kevin Michael Nicolescu
1708 N 30th st
Boise, ID 83703
Defendant.

--------~~~~-------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion ... Tuesday, February 14, 2012 ... 03:30 PM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:
Defendant:

Mailed
Hand Delivered _ _
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date _ __

Edward Joe Guerricabeitia
POBox1583
Boise ID 83701

Private Counsel: Mailed
Clerk

Prosecutor:

~

Py-=_ Hand f~vi::::::;6,..._
~ Date

lnterdep~ental Mail 'fJ
Clerk ~

lI

Date bl~-\ I

DAda

~/

Signature ....
~=-="-'--...;..._/-4-'/.....:::l<:;.o:;;..;..o"'---=:..........;=::;;.._

Phone .l.....--L-----------

~oise DEagle D G.C. D Meridian

Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail _ _
Clerk
Date _ _ __
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mailed
Hand Delivered_ _
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __

Dated: 12/19/2011

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the Court

By:~.

DetCferk

NOTICE OF HEARING
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JAN 2 4 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
DEPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012

***
COME NOW the Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of
record Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and
Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, Michael Dean of the Boise City
Prosecutor's Office and hereby stipulate and agree to continue the pending Motion for
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON
FEBRUARY 14, 2012- 1
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Suppression scheduled on February 14, 2012 to a new date and time convenient for the Court
and parties on the grounds that Defendant's counsel has a three (3) day jury trial beginning on
February 13, 2012 in the District Court in Canyon County.
Defendant counsel's has no unavailable dates in March 2012.
DATED this 2-1./h day of January, 2012.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

DATED this_ day of January, 2012.
BOISE CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

By:
Michael Dean, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Boise City Atty

01/24/2012 10:14 FAX
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~

Suppression scheduled on February 14, 2012 to a new date and time convenient for the Court ·
and parties on the grounds that Defendant's counsel has a thr~e (3) day jury trial beginning on.
February 13, 2012 in the District Court in Canyon County.
Defendant counsel's has no unavailable dates in March 2012.
DATED this_ day of January~ 2012.

DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By;

Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant

DATED this

tl day of January~ 2012.
~'SOFFICE
.,
\

By:

c--_--. ._; ,. .; ; _ _~

Michael Dean, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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FEBRUARY 14, 2012-2

--.- ....

··- .. ·--·-··--- ....

·---·-·---···~-·----.

-..-····--·--·----·-· ···----·------··-·· ·- "'' ··-··-······--·-· ·-·---·-- ....
000056

-

l

•

.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
fo
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[vf
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
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'NO.
A.M-.82"'7;;:7.~~'r"":F:;o::"IL~:::::::~----

F:EB '0 6 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
RECE\VED
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
JAN '! ~ ?.tl\'1.
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
COUNT'< CLERK
ADA
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
ORDER TO CONTINUE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012

***
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the parties' Stipulation for
Continuance, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing currently set for February 14, 2012, is
vacated and will be continued on the

L2-

day of

ttpc; \ ,

2012.

ORDER TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON
FEBRUARY 14, 2012- 1

000058

DATED thiblkday of January, 2012.

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia
Davison & Copple
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

[
[

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

]
]

[ ]

Clerk of the Court

ORDER TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON
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IN THE DISTRICT ,COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
_ __
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA O
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
FEB 8 2012
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702cHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

)
)

By ERIN PENA
DEPUTY

)

Kevin Michael Nicolescu
1708 N 30th st
Boise, ID 83703
Defendant.

--------~~~==-------------------

)
)

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076

)

NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion ... Friday, April13, 2012 ... 09:30 AM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the
Court and oh file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:
Defendant:

Mailed
Hand Delivered ___
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date _ __

Edward Joe Guerricabeitia
PO Box 1583
Boise ID 83701
Private Counsel: Mailed \ / () A
Clerk ~atUAJLU 15

Han~r.edt

Phone .l....--.....1.-------------

Ada Vsoise DEagle D G.C. D Meridian

Prosecutor:

Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail _ _
Clerk
Date _ _ ___
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mailed
Hand Delivered._ _
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __

Dated: 2/6/2012

NOTICE OF HEARING
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~~-----F-1~.~ 1;t
APR -6 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
DEPUTY

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Andrea D. Carroll .
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7763
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE
SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH
TEST RESULTS

)

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Andrea D. Carroll, Assistant City
Attorney, and hereby objects to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to the intersection of Idaho and 16th
streets in Boise, Ada County, Idaho in reference to a vehicle collision with injuries. While the
officer spoke with Kevin Nicolescu, one of the identified.drivers involved in the collision, he
noticed the strong odor of alcohol and also noticed that his eyes were red, bloodshot and watery.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS 1
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Additionally, the Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol that night. Officer Palic attempted to
conduct field sobriety tests on the Defendant. The officer first attempted to conduct the
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and scored the Defendant 4 of 6 points but did finish the
test due to an injury to the Defendant's left eye that was incurred as part of the accident. The
Defendant complained that his adrenaline was kicking in and the officer could see that the
Defendant's legs were beginning to shake and the Defendant was very unsteady on his feet. Due
to these factors, the Officer did not continue with additional field sobriety tests. Tl:le officer
asked the Defendant to submit to an initial breath test on a machine known as an AlcoSensor.
The Defendant's results were .108. Based on all of this information, the officer asked the
Defendant to listen to the ALS advisory tape, observed the Defendant for the required 15 minute
waiting period, then had the Defendant submit to additional breath tests on the LifeLoc portable
breath test instrument resulting in .103 and .096 BrAC. The Defendant was at no time arrested.
After the breath test results he was cited for driving under the influence and transported to Saint
Alphonsus for medical treatment.
ARGUMENT

A.

The correct standard for detaining. a suspect for additional questioning and
investigation prior to an arrest is reasonable suspicion.
The Defendant argues that the case law requires probable cause prior to having a suspect

submit to an evidentiary test. However, careful review of the relevant case law reveals that any
requirements for probable cause are more related to facts in those cases where a defendant is
cuffed and transported to a new location to submit to the additional evidentiary test. The fact
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS2
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that is legally relevant to requiring an elevated standard is whether an arrest has happened or not.
That is simply not at issue in this case when the suspect was detained on site only, was never
transported to any location for the purpose of further investigation, and was merely cited, riot
arrested.
The Fourth Amendment, as well as the Idaho Constitution, require that all searches and
seizures be reasonable. City ofIndianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S. Ct. 447,451, 148
L.Ed.2d 333, 340 (2000); State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 399, 162 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App.
2007); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997). Warrantless
searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within one of the few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); State v.
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); Metzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162
P .3d at 778. When a private vehicle is stopped by the police, the occupants are "seized" for the
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400,
168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 210 P.3d 578 (Ct. App. 2009).
In order for an investigatory stop to be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, an
officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed or is about to
commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908-09
(1968). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d
700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999).
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS3
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An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and
those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State
v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). At the conclusion of an

investigatory stop, an officer's suspicions may or may not prove to be correct. "[I]n order to
satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded
of the many factual determinations that must r~gularly be made by agents of the government ... is
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 159 (1990). The reasonableness of the
suspicion must be evaluate,d upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop.
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709.

The reasonable suspicion standard develops from case law separately from the probable
cause standard. Probable cause to arrest a suspect exists "where the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense." Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App.
2003) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 59596 (1991)).
The Defendant cites to Thompson in support of his argument that probable cause is the
correct standard required prior to requiring a suspect to submit to an evidentiary test. The one
thing that is clear from reading that case, though, is that the Court did not rule on the matter.
Additionally, the Court illustrated that the issue was one nuanced in the statutory interpretation
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS 4
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pver Idaho Code§ 18-8002(4)(b) in its use of the phrase "legal cause." Thompson at 515, 65
P.3d at

~37.

That statute is not at issue in this case, though, because the statute concerns the

suspension of a drivers license for refusing to take a test. There was no alleged refusal in this
case, so there is no need for the court to go into the nuanced analysis that the Thompson case did
regarding the meaning of the phrase "legal cause."
If the Court is to consider the Thompson case for guidance, the court was careful to note
in its decision that in Ferreira, the court required a reasonable suspicion standard. !d. The
Thompson court distinguished the facts from that in Ferreira, noting ~hat in Ferreira the facts did

not involve "transporting an individual to a law enforcement building or hospital for breath,
urine or bl9od testing." !d. This case is like Ferreira, not Thompson, in that there was no
transportation of the Defendant to a new location for an evidentiary test, which is more likely to
require an arrest of the individual. In this case, there was no transportation of the Defendant nor
was there an arrest.
Based on the above analysis, the State asks the Court to use a "reasonable suspicion"
standard in its review of the facts of the case.
B.

In this case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant.

In this case, the officer had made observations that the Defendant had strong odor of
alcohol and also noted that his eyes were red, bloodshot and watery. Additionally, the Defendant
admitted. to consuming alcohol that night. The officer did not continue administration of the
field sobriety tests after observing that the Defendant's injuries were compromising the tests and
potentially posing a safety issue for the Defendant in performing the tests.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS5
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The officer responsibly altered the approach of his investigation to respond to unique
'

facts and circumstances. If the Defendant had performed and failed the field sobriety tests, the
Defendant would be arguing that the injuries obviously compromised the officer's ability to rely
on the results. If the officer had administered the field sobriety tests and the Defendant injured
himself trying to perform the tests, the Defendant would be arguing the officer's actions in
following a prescribed formula that no longer made sense under the circumstances was
irresponsible and neglient. In this case, the officer did the only thing he could do under the
circumstances. He adminis!ered an AlcoSensor test, a preliminary investigatory test analogous
to a NIK test used for the purpose of investigation possession of a controlled substance, to
determine if further detainment of the suspect was necessary. While the AlcoSensor test might
not meet the statutory requirements for admission of a breath test at trial under 18-8004(4), the
AlcoSensor, like other preliminary tests, play an important role in aiding an officer in decisions
of whether to extend his detainment of an individual for additional testing.
· At the time the officer asked for the Defendant to blow into the LifeLoc instrument, the
State had both reasonable suspicion as well as probable cause to make an arrest. However, the
correct standard for justifying temporary detainment is reasonable suspicion. It is only unless
there is going to be an arrest that probable cause is required. In this case, since there was no
arrest, the Court need only find that the officer had reasonable suspicion to fmd the detainment
justified and the evidence obtained therefrom admissible.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this S d a y of April, 2012, I serVed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

hsMAIL

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
FACSIMILE
_' HAND DELIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING- 8
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APR 1 3 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

-~f\if-+f\'~C001-\Ji\.Q~~~'-+9 -~-Ke~'A~Ji~ni:---.l
Defendant.

I

Appearances: D AC

DEC D GC D MC

/[p1{ - \ 10 J (e

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
AND MINUTE ENTRY

~hambers

)
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Defense Counsel£.

)

Cqse No.

Prosecutor

_....,{2.,..!1Ayb=-~~~-+-{___

~.tvr=ci ~terpreter - - - - - - - - -

0

Jury trial waived and case is to be re-set for court trial.

D

Plea and sentence via Defense Counsel authorized by Defendant: Rule 6(d), IMR
and/or IIR.

D

Pre-trial motions, timely filed, are set for hearing o n - - - - - - - - - ' at

....,....-------·m.

D

Case is re-set for - - - - - - - - - - a t _ _ _ _ _ _ .m.

D

Defendant failed to appear. Absence not explained, justified, or excused.
Trial date vacated. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued.

~dsetat$

·

.

~er:~~~~w~
\p~ t'Yler-o~

Dated this

1.3

.dayof.
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~J

Defendant
Address:

Df

Telephone: --....,.....,-__....,..------Clerk:
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IN THE DISTRICT~COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI'STRIG.Jb...-.O..;..F...;.T.;;..;;H=E--:::":"=---STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD~.M._ _ _ _
F'L~~.~---MAGISTRATE DIVISION
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
APR 1 6 2012

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JUSTIN VOLLE

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Kevin Michael Nicolescu
1708 N 30th st
Boise, ID 83703

DEPUTY

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
NOTICE OF HEARING

Defendant.
)
----------------------------------NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion ... Monday, June 11, 2012 ... 03:30 PM
Judge: John Hawley Jr.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:
Defendant:

Mailed
Hand Delivered ____
Clerk _______ Date _ __

Edward Joe Guerricabeitia
PO Box 1583
Boise ID 83701
Private Counsel: Mailed
Clerk
Prosecutor:

t£

Hand~~e0ptX.

Date

Interdepartmental Mail ex(_
ClerkVL:
Date

Phone

~~-------------------

D Adatm.ftoise D Eagle D G. C. D Meridian

Lt??P

.

Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail ____
Clerk
Date _ _ ___
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mailed
Hand Delivered. ____
Clerk _______ Date ______

Dated: 4/13/2012

NOTICE OF HEARING

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D.ISX.R.LCT DE tp.~E?f~STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
JUN 15 2012
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
cHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri<

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

Kevin Michael Nicolescu
1708 N 30th st
Boise, ID 83703
. Defendant.
-----------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ByDONNALEE
DEPUTY

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Motion ... Monday, July 02, 2012 ... 03:30 PM
· Judge: John Hawley Jr.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows:
Defendant:

Mailed
Hand Delivered ____
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date ____

Edward Joe Guerricabeitia
PO Box 1583
Boise ID 83701
Private Counsel:
Clerk W!F- d

Maile~~

Prosecutor:

Hand Delivered=--_
Date

lnterde~e;tal Mail
Clerk

(.C2

-15

(..../" D Ada

DateQ:, -l(B"

i[Boise D Eagle D G.C. D Meridian

Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail _ _
Clerk
Date _ _ __
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mailed
Hand Delivered_ _
Clerk _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __

Dated: 6/14/2012

NOTICE OF HEARING

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of
Court
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Courtroom207

Judge Hawley-- D. Finnega .. - 7-2-12

Time
3:49:05 PM

Speaker
~

Note
jNicolescu MD 11-17076
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NO. _ _ _"':i;-.:n-"""":""'-=--

A.M. _ _ _ _F_'LI~~

J: 2D

JUL 2 5 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~~"iOOHER D. RICH, Clerk
~Yo'E~DRE FINNEGAN
DEPUTY

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:

)
) Case No. CR-MD-2011- 17076

)
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
) REGARDING MOTION
) TO SUPPRESS
)
)
)

Andrea Carroll, Assistant Boise City Prosecuting Attorney
Ed Guerricabeitia, Attorney for Defendant

I.FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu (Nicolescu) was involved in
a two vehicle collision at the intersection of Idaho and 161h streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise
City Police Officer Ransom responded to the scene. Officer Chris Palic of the Boise City
Police Department then arrived on the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu.
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded through a green light west
bound on Idaho Street when the other vehicle northbound on 16th Street apparently ran a
red light and collided with his vehicle. While speaking with Nicolescu, Officer Palic
detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that
Nicolescu had red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of slurred speech
or impaired memory. There were some minor cuts and abrasions to Nicolescu's face,
which Palic assumed were caused by the deployment of the airbag during

~e

collision.

Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic.
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Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. Officer
Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. After
starting the HGN test, Officer Palic had scored Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision points, but
did not complete the test due to an injury to Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a
result of the accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was kicking in and
Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking and that he was unsteady on his feet.
Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who was also on the
scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had observed a strong odor of alcohol, glassy
bloodshot eyes, that Nicolescu had scored 4 of 6 decision points on the HGN (which
would have been a failure) prior to terminating the test and that Nicolescu admitted he
had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been
caused by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and it is also possible they
resulted from Nicolescu consuming alcohol or even a combination of both factors. Palic
explained that he did not want to perform other FSTs because Nicolescu was visibly
shaken by the accident.
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern because his only
contact with Nicolescu was after the accident. Palic testified that he felt that he had
enough information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI. Palic testified that based on
the totality of circumstances he told Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to
operate a motor vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the discussion between Palic
and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic should continue his investigation to determine if
Nicolescu was safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he might be under the influence
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of alcohol.

Paramedics on the scene examined Nicolescu and noted that he had a

scratched cornea.
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to continue the
HGN test because of the eye injury and because Nicolescu was shaken up.
Palic then stated:

1

"What I am going to have you do is blow into a device

[AlcoSensor] and we'll just go from there. O.K. and we'll go from there. And I will
make my determination from there."
Nicolescu replied: "Dude I'm willing to cooperate however."
Palic stated: "It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K."
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then continued by
explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a tight seal around the pipe and blow real
hard.
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test on the Alco-Sensor, which is a
handheld breath alcohol tester. The Alco-Sensor is not certified and is not performance
verified. It is used to detect the presence of alcohol in individuals.

The result of the

preliminary Alco-Sensor test was .1 08 which is over the legal limit. Officer Palic then
handcuffed Nicolescu and placed him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath
samples. After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS advisory, using the Lifeloc
instrument, further Nicolescu provided further samples which registered results of .1 03
and .096. Nicolescu was then cited- not arrested- for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol, a misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004.

Nicolescu was not

1

The State has provided the court with Officer Palic's audio of the investigation ofNicolescu. The audio
was not introduced or admitted as an exhibit at the July 2 suppression hearing. However, subsequent to the
hearing the court obtained and reviewed the audio recording.
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transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI, rather he was transported to
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of the eye injury.
On December 2, 2011, Nicolescu filed a motion to suppress the results of the
second breath test, asserting that the officer did not have the necessary probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further evidentiary testing, absent the
results of the preliminary breath test. Nicolescu also asserts that it was improper for the
officer to require him to submit to the preliminary breath test in order to substantiate
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to charge Nicolescu with DUI. On April 5, 2012,
the state filed its opposition to defendant's Motion. The hearing was scheduled for
February 14, 2012 but was continued at Defendant's request. The next scheduled hearing
was continued due to an officer's unavailability. The Court took up the Motion at hearing
on July 2, 2012.

II. ANALYSIS
An officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a person is driving under the

influence (DUI) of alcohol may require a driver to submit to evidentiary testing to
determine if their breath/alcohol content is greater than the statutory limitation of .08. See
I.C. § 18-8002. Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) defines evidentiary testing as a procedure or
test or series of procedures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol. If a
person submits to testing at the request of a peace officer and has an alcohol
concentration ofless than .08, they shall not be prosecuted for DUI. LC. § 18-8004(2).
The detention of Nicolescu for investigation is a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment which guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v.
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Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 981 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1999). Although in this case, the

specific issue is not "the stop" because Nicolescu had been involved in a traffic accident
and the officers did not witness any driving pattern or traffic infractions. A Fourth
Amendment issue arises here because the preliminary breath test is also a search
requiring either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. It is well settled
that an investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 s. Ct 1868 (1968). Here Nicolescu challenges the request

for a preliminary breath test on the grounds that Officer Palic allegedly used it as a basis
to establish a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Nicolescu had been driving
under the influence. The reasonableness of an investigatory detention is a fact-intensive
determination, from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, but "in view of
all of the surrounding circumstances" of the particular incident. State v. Waldie, 126
Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Idaho App. 1995). The reasonable suspicion standard requires
less than probable cause but more than mere suspicion or instinct on the part of the
officer. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). In this
case Nicolescu had been involved in a collision and there was a need for assistance.
Officer Palic had a duty to investigate the accident and determine if Nicolescu had been
injured.
Officer Palic promptly made several observations which led him to believe that
Nicolescu may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Palic started to conduct
standard field sobriety tests but discontinued them because he noted Nicolescu had
suffered an eye injury and was visibly shaken by the accident. Palic testified that there
might have been a safety issue and that the results of the FSTs could have been
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compromised had he continued with them. Discontinuing the FSTs was reasonable
because Nicolescu may have injured himself attempting to perform the tests and it would
not have been fair to require Nicolescu to perform the tests.
The State contends Palic adapted to the unique facts and circumstances by asking
Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test, which was the only thing he could do.
The State contends that Nicolescu consented to take the preliminary breath test.
In a consent situation, the burden is on the state to show that the consent was voluntary
and not the product of coercion, either direct or implied; the consent is evaluated in light
of all the attendant circumstances which existed at the time consent was given. State v.
Zavala, 5 P.3d 993, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Idaho App. 2000).

Further, consent may be

voluntary even if given during a lawful investigatory detention, State v. Johnson, 137
Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2002).
Palic administered an AlcoSensor test to determine if Nicolescu should be
detained for further investigation. As Officer Moore testified, the investigation would
have ended ifNicolescu had registered a preliminary breath test result under .08.
The AlcoSensor test clearly does not meet statutory requirements for admission of
a breath test under I. C. 18-8004(4). It is not certified or performance verified. In this
case where standard FSTs could not be utilized Palic used the AlcoSensor for a
preliminary breath test to determine if Nicolescu should be investigated further or
released.
After the AlcoSensor test was administered Nicolescu was required to submit to
testing on the LifeLoc which resulted in the DUI charge. There is no express statutory
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authority either prohibiting or permitting a preliminary breath test. There is no Idaho
case law discussing the use of the preliminary breath test.
In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI prior to administering the preliminary breath test.
However, Palic's comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as to whether Nicolescu
was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu that after the preliminary breath
test he would make his determination from there.
At the time the test was provided Nicolescu was not handcuffed or restrained. He
was not seated in a patrol vehicle. Rather he was standing outside of Palic's squad car.
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a search
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908,

917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P3d at 741 (2007); State v. LeClercq,
243 P.3d 1093, 149 Idaho 905 (Idaho App. 2010). Taking one's breath for a preliminary
breath test is a search under the Fourth Amendment. County of Milwaukee v. Proegler,
291 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1980); see also State v. LeClercq, 243 P.3d 1093, 149
Idaho 905 (Idaho App. 2010) (a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment).
Searches and seizures performed without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. To overcome the presumption,
the State bears the burden of establishing two prerequisites. !d. First, the State must prove
that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the

w~ant

requirement. Id Second, the State must show that even if the search is permissible under
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an exception to the warrant requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the
other surrounding circumstances. !d.

Valid consent is an exception to the warrant

requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Fee, 135
Jdaho 857, 862, 26 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2001). The state has the legal burden of
proving that Nicolescu's consent was given freely, understandingly and voluntarily, and
not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamante,
412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Zavala,
5 P.3d 993, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Idaho App. 2000).
In determining whether consent was voluntary, the trial court should consider
whether the individual was threatened or coerced, and whether he was informed of his
rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,
and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account,
the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to_
establishing a voluntary consent. Bustamante, 412 U.S, at 248-49.
In this case the evidence demonstrates that Nicolescu was not given the choice to
submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told that he was going to
have to blow into a device. There was no explanation that he did not have to submit to
the preliminary breath test and that if he declined it wouldn't be used against him. There
was no indication that the preliminary breath test was "offered" to Nicolescu. Nicolescu
was simply told that he would blow into a device. The State must show consent was
given freely and voluntarily. In this case Nicolescu acquiesced when he was told he was
going to blow into a device. Mere submission to lawful authority does not equate to
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consent, rather valid consent must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and
intelligently given. US. v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 275 (lOth Cir.l993) (citing Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497, 103 S.Ct. 1319,75 L.Ed.2d 229 [1983] ). Nicolescu was never
offered a choice. Rather he was simply told he was going to blow into a device. 2
The State has failed to show that Nicolescu's consent was given freely,
understandingly and voluntarily.

3

Where the State fails to meet its burden, evidence

acquired as a result of an illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived from
the original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796,
69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707
(1999). See also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). The exclusionary
nile states that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible
in the criminal trial of a defendant. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394-98, 34
S.Ct. 341, 345-46, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1288, 110 Idaho 516
(Idaho 1986).

2

Preliminary breath tests are commonly used by officers in the field to evaluate a DUI suspect's
breath/alcohol content in other jurisdictions. Because Idaho law does not specifically allow preliminary
breath tests, the investigating officer must assure that the suspect freely, understandingly and voluntarily
consents to the test. At a minimum the officer must: (I) Explain what the preliminary breath test is and
why it is being offered; (2) explain to the suspect that he has a choice to take the test or decline the test; (3)
actually ask the suspect if he is willing to take the test; (4) obtain consent of the suspect.

3

Nicloescu probably would have consented to the preliminary test because he indicated he wanted to
cooperate. However, his options were never explained to him.
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I

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Nicolescu did not freely,
understandingly and voluntarily consent to the preliminary breath test.

In this case

where it would have been unsafe and unfair to require Nicolescu to complete the standard
filed sobriety tests, it was reasonable for Palic to use the preliminary breath test
investigative tool to determine if Nicolescu was over the legal limit.

However,

Nicolescu did not consent freely, understandingly and voluntarily to the preliminary
breath test.
Without the preliminary breath test the officer did not have the necessary
reasonable and articulable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further evidentiary
testing.

Thus the subsequent breath alcohol results obtained on the Lifeloc are

inadmissible in this case. Nicolescu's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED THIS&day of July, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the __ day of JULY, 2012, I served a true and accurate
photocopy of the foregoing document to the persons identified below by the method
inaicated:
Andrea Carroll, Esq.
Boise City Prosecuting Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701

_ By United States mail
_ By telefacsimile
_ By personal delivery
_By overnight mail/Federal Express
X By Interoffice Mail

Ed Guerricabeitia, Esq.
DVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Capitol Chase Plaza, Suite 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

X By United States mail
_By telefacsimile
_ By personal delivery
_By overnight mail/Federal Express
_ By Interoffice Mail

Christopher D. Rich
Clerk of the District Court

/

·h

Deputy Clerk
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AUG 2 9 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELAINE TONG
DEPUTY

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439

RECEIVEt IN TRANSCRIPTS

~ '.JJ" '1.

rlfv

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THESTATEOFIDAHO,
Plaintiff!Appellant, .
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
')
)
)
)

)
)
)
).

Appeal Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076

NOTICE OF APPEAL

_________________________ )
TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, KEVIN M. NICOLESCU , BY AND
THROUGH ED GUERRICABEITIA, ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, the State of Idaho, appeals against the Defendant, Kevin

M. Nicolescu, to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, from the Memorandum
Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress in Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076, entered on July 25,
2012, in the Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Honorable
· Judge John Hawley, Jr. presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2. That the State has the right to appeal ~o the District Court, and the Judgment described
1

in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1.
3, That the appeal is taken upon all matters of fact and law.
4. That the Appellant anticipates raising issues including, but not limited to:
a. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in gnmting Mr. Nicolescu's Motion to
Suppress.
6. The State requests no additional documents be included in the clerk's record beyond
those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules:
I

7. That the proceedings before the Honorable Judge John Hawley, Jr. on the Motion to
Suppress were electronically tape recorded in the Magistrate's Division and said tape recording is
in the possession and under the control of the Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial
District, County of Ada, State of Idaho.
8. That pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.6(a), a transcript should be required.
9. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

~

day of August, 2012.
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this

~

day of August, 2012, served the foreg()ing

document on counsel for the Defendant/Respondent as follows:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
XUSMAIL
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
_FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
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No. _ _ _Fin:nn-:+b!!;-.:_
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'12,

AUG 2 9 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY

By ELAINE TONG
DEPUTY

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

MOTION TO HOLD MATTER IN
ABEYANCE PENDING APPEAL

______________ )
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City
Attorney, and respectfully moves the Court to hold the above-entitled matter in abeyance.
Contemporaneous with this Motion the State has filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court's
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress. The State moves to hold this matter in
abeyance until a ruling has been obtained on the appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1(d)
and Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(7).
DATED this

~

day of August 2012.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

MOTION TO HOLD MATTER IN ABEYANCE PENDING APPEAL- 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

?st

day of August 2012, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
2(usMAIL
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER
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NO.
1('
FILED
A.M _ _ _ _,P.M--:..---
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AUG 3 1 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RAE ANN NIXON
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

KEVIN M. NICOLESCU,
Defendant/Appellant,

)
)
)
)
) Case No. CRMD-2011-0017076
.
..
)
) NOTICE OF PREPARATION
) OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT
)

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on August 31, 2012 and a copy of said
Notice was received by the Transcription Department onAugust 31, 2012. I certify the estimated
cost of preparation of the appeal transcript to be:
Type ofHearing: Appeal
Date of Hearing: July 2, 2012 Judge: John Hawley, Jr.
45 Pages x $3.25 = $146.25
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, Urtless otherwise
ordered by. a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion.
In this case, the Ada Co. Prosecutor has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript fee upon
completion of the transcript.
'.:

The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may mak.e
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application to the District Judge for an extension oftime in which to prepare the transcript.

Dated this 31st day of August, 2012.
ANN NIXON
Ada County Transcript Coordinator

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certifY that on this 31st day of August, 2012, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Preparation
of Appeal Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by first class
mail, at:
Ada Co. Prosecutor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
SARAH MILLAR

ANN NIXON
Ada County Transcript Coordinator
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SEP 1 2 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
vs.
ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant/Respondent.

Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the
testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal:

It is ORDERED:
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14
days after the filing of the notice of appeal.
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the notice
of the filing of the transcript.
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service of
appellant's brief.
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after service
of respondent's brief.
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;

5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all briefs are
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice
for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and
the record.
Dated this 12th day of September 2012.

afh4?--

MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN
Sr. District Judge
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CARY B. COLAIANNI
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 384-3870
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
Defendant.

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

ORDER HOLDING MATTER IN
ABEYANCE PENDING APPEAL

--------~-----------------)
The State of Idaho has requested the above matter be held in abeyance until the appeal
has been completed.
Good causing having been shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter be held in
abeyance until a ruling is filed in the appeal.
DATED this

4

day of __

___,>pt==-~-=-------' 2012.
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YOU ARE NOTIFIED that you may pick up a copy of said transcript at the
District Clerk's Office, Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, ID 83702.
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are recei~ed -within twenty-one
(21) days from the date of mailing of this notice,
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transcript shall be deemed settled.

Date this 2ND day of October, 2012.

.

0

°

,

0

Dep9t); ~Perk of the District Court

•

0.

,•

...

. ... .
~

NOTICE OF LODGING

- 1-

000097

I hereby certify that on this 2ND day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City Attorney,
and hereby files its Appellant's Brief in the above-captioned matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the early morning hours of October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to the
intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Ada County, Idaho in reference to a vehicle
copision. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-11.) Palic made contact with the driver of one of the vehicles involved
in the accident, Kevin Nicolescu. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 17-18; p. 7, Ls. 3-6.) Palic did this at the
request of one of the investigating officers based on that officer's suspicion that the defendant
may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.7, Ls. 19-25.)
Upon contact with Nicolescu, Palic noted several indicators of alcohol consumption
including "a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from [Nicolescu's] breath as he
spoke", that he was unsteady on his feet, that he "had a pretty severe sway", and that he had
bloodshot, watery eyes. Additionally, Nicolescu admitted to Palic that he had consumed alcohol
that night. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-21.) Palic did not note any slurred speech or impaired memory,
however. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 9-12.)
Palic asked whether Nicolescu had been medically cleared, to which Nicolescu indicated
that he had. (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 3-5.) At that time, Palic began conducting field sobriety tests. The
first test he conducted was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.)
Nicolescu scored 4 of 6 possible points on the test (meeting the decision points), but was unable
to finish due to an apparent injury he had sustained to his· left eye as a result of the accident. (Tr.,
p. 9, Ls. 1-6.) Palic directed Nicolescu to be checked by paramedics again, and thereafter

1
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attempted to complete the HGN test. Palic observed that Nicolescu's eye was still bothering him
and discontinued the test. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 6-12.)
Palic did not perform any other standardized field sobriety tests on Nicolescu at that time,
as Nicolescu began to shake and complained of being unsteady on his feet due to a rush of
adrenaline as a result of the accident. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-13.)
Although Palic had probable cause to arrest Nicolescu for DUI, Palic decided to collect a
final piece of evidence using a handheld breath test instrument called an Alcosensor. (Tr., p. 10,
Ls. 15-18, 24-25.) Immediately after having attempted the HGN test for the second time, and
without handcuffing Nicolescu or placing him in his patrol vehicle, Palic had Nicolescu blow
·into; his handheld Alcosensor.

(Tr. at p. 11, Ls. 5-18.) According to Palic, the purpose of

administering this test was not to obtain and thereafter introduce a specific alcohol level into
evidence at a trial, but rather to test for the presence of alcohol as an additional· piece of his
investigation into whether Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p. 22, Ls.
7-10.) Officer Moore who assisted Palic and ultimately administered the final evidentiary test,
explained that the Alcosensor did indicate a number, and had Nicolescu's result registered lower
than the statutory threshold of .08, Nicolescu would not have been arrested 1.

(Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-

11; p. 40, L. 20 through p. 41, L. 6.)
At that time, and based on the totality of the circumstances he observed, Palic turned
Nicolescu over to Officer Moore, who then administered the evidentiary breath test with a
Lifeloc instrument in accordance with statutory requirements (ld. at p. 28, Ls. 19-21) and

1

While Palic's testimony did not specifically address this, it can be presumed that Nicolescu was in excess of the
.08 threshold based on Officer Moore's testimony, that Nicolescu would not have been arrested had he blown under
.08 on the Alcosensor. {Tr p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p. 40, L. 20 through p. 41, L. 6.)

2
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Nicolescu was ultimately charged with driving under the influence based on the results of that
test. (Tr. p. 12, Ls. 2-14.) Nicolescu was not taken to the jail, however, but rather, was cited and
released so he could seek further medical treatment at the hospital for injuries sustained in the
accident. (Tr. p. 11, Ls. 18-23.)
On December 5, 2011, Nicolescu filed Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The
State responded with its Brief in Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc Breath Test Results
filed April 6, 2012. After several continuances, a hearing on Nicolescu's niotion 'Yas held July
2, 2012, at 3:30p.m. After consideration of testimony and the filings by both parties, the court
issued a written opinion on July 25, 2012, granting the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence. The State thereafter concurrently filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion to Hold Matter
in Abeyance on August 29, 2011.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the magistrate court err when it concluded that sufficient evidence did not exist to allow
officers to administer a breath test ofNicolescu?
ARGUMENT

A. Introduction
Nicolescu was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of Idaho
Code § 18-8004. He filed a motion to suppress the breath results, asserting that the preliminary
breath test offered by Palic was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and that
it was therefore a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evidence
'

p. 7.) The magistrate court granted the motion to suppress, holding that based on the Palic's
failure to obtain specific consent from Nicolescu, the preliminary breath test administered by

3
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Palic was an illegal search, and that without such preliminary breath results, reasonable and
articulable suspicion did not exist to allow further evidentiary testing of Nicolescu. J
(Mem.Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress pp. 9-10.)

The magistrate court erred in its

decision. The magistrate court incorrectly treated Nicolescu's roadside blow into an Alcosensor
as an evidentiary search, requiring consent, This is in error for two reasons: First,
required prior to performing an evidentiary breath test.

cons~nt

is not

Second, and more importantly, the

roadside preliminary breath test was not a formal evidentiary test equating to a de facto arrest,
and should not have been treated as such.
After improperly eliminating the Alcosensor breath test from its analysis, the magistrate
court then found that officer administration of the evidentiary breath test was not supported by
reasonable suspicion. This was error because whether or not the preliminary Alcosensor test was
used, not only was the reasonable suspicion standard met, but the higher threshold of probable
cause existed to arrest Nicolescu and administer the evidentiary breath test.
B. Standard of Review.
The standard of review for a suppression motion is bifurcated. An appellate court will
accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
C. An Officer does not Have to Obtain Specific Consent to Administer a Breath or Blood
Test from a Suspect Who has been Driving.
The State does not dispute that a traditional evidentiary breath test constitutes a search
and seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment as well as Article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). See also Hafen v.
4
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State, 136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257, 261 (2002). In order to overcome the presumption that

such a seizure is unlawful, the State must prove that it falls within a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Consent is one of these exceptions. Hafen, 136 Idaho at 833, 41 P.3d at
261.
In the instant case the magistratt;: held:
The state must show consent was given freely and voluntarily. In this case
Nicolescu acquiesced when he was told he was going to blow into a
device. Mere submission to lawful authority does not equate to consent,
rather valid consent must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and
intelligently given. Nicolescu was never offered a choice.

(Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress, dated July 25, 2011, pp. 8-9.) (citations omitted).
It is on the basis of lack of consent that the magistrate court determined the preliminary breath

test administered by Palic was unlawful. It appears that the magistrate court considered the
preliminary breath test a traditional evidentiary breath test as a per se arrest for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis.
However, with regard to investigations of driving under the influence in violation of
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a), the Idaho Legislature has addressed this issue, and Idaho courts
have as well. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) reads,
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary
testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho
Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is
administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to
believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control 'of a
motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho
Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.

5
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(emphasis added). Idaho courts have addressed this statute directly, and reiterated the plain
language of§ 18-8002(1). The Court of Appeals noted in State v. Cooper,
Idaho's driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of possessing a
valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented
to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI laws.

136 Idaho 697, 699, 39 P.3d 637, 639 (2001). In State v. Diaz the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
In Idaho "any person who drives or is in actual physical control" of a
motor vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for alcohol at the
request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI.
Implied consent to evidentiary testing is not limited to a breathalyzer test,
but may also include testing the suspect's blood or urine. The evidentiary
test to be employed is of the officer's choosing.

144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at, 741 (citations omitted). Similar rulings can be found in Hafen v.
State, 136 Idaho at 832, 41 P.3d at 260, and State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 909, 243 P.3d

1093, 1097 (2010), the latter decision even specifying that "[w]hether or not a police officer
.gives the required warnings bears nothing on the issue of consent." !d.
Thus, if the preliminary breath test administered by Palic is considered an evidentiary test
for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ), then consent had previously been given by the
defendant when he drove his vehicle that night, and the magistrate court erred in holding that
Nicolescu had failed to give consent.
D. The Preliminary Breath Test is not an Evidentiary Test for Purposes of Idaho Code §
18-8002 (1) but. Rather a Roadside Field Sobriety Test Requiring Reasonable Suspicion.

In the alternative to the foregoing analysis however, the State contends that the
preliminary breath test was not, in fact, an evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-

6

000109

8002(1), but rather more appropriately considered another of the many field sobriety tests
commonly conducted as part of an investigatory detention at the side of the road. It is well
established by the courts in this state that reasonable suspicion is the standard applied to such
tests.
In State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, .480, 988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct.App. 1999) the Idaho

Court of Appeals ruled that roadside field sobriety tests did not require probable cause, but
rather, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, when it determined that roadside field
sobriety tests were investigative detentions rather than de facto arrests.

Having made that

finding the Court stated, "Therefore, we hold again today, based on established precedent and
thorough analysis, that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires only
that an officer possess reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating a vehicle contrary to I.C.
section 18-8004 before field sobriety tests may be administered." (Id. at 480-481, 988 P.2d at
706-707 (citing State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605, 861 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App. 1993), State v.
Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 775, 839 P.2d 38, 42 (Ct.App. 1992)).

Pertinent to the instant case, the Ferriera court provided insight into why that lesser
standard was appropriate as it related to roadside field sobriety tests: "the factors to be
considered in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the seriousness
of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the
officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds." Id. at 480,
988 P.2d at 706.
With respect to the seriousness of the crime, the court provided, "The Idaho Supreme
Court has previously held that '[w]ithout question, the drunk driver is one of society's greatest

7
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concems'"Id., citing State v. Henderson, .114 Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988).
Here, Nicolescu was suspected of DUI, just as was the case in Ferriera. The State's interest in
the instant case of enforcing the DUI laws was, to use the Ferriera court's terminology, "of
paramount concern" id., and such violations are very serious in nature.
With respect to the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, and the
reasonableness ofthe officer's display of force, the Ferriera court reasoned, "Field sobriety tests
are, by their very definition, done in the "field" typically on the side of a public thoroughfare and
are ordinarily performed contemporaneously with a traffi<:: stop." Id. The field sobriety tests
were performed immediately after Ferriera was asked to exit his vehicle. Id. In the instant case,
Nicolescu was asked to blow into the Alcosensor instrument as he was standing on the side of
the road, without restraint, without a wait period, and immediately after Palic determined he
could not continue with the standardized field sobriety testing he had been conducting to that
point. (Tr., at p. 11, Ls. 5-18; p. 36, Ls. 2-8.)
In its decision the magistrate court, despite concluding that Nicolescu did not consent to
the breath test and that it was therefore unlawful, did acknowledge that "[in] this case where it
would have been unsafe and unfair to require Nicolescu to complete the standard filed [sic]
sobriety tests, it was reasonable for Palic to use the preliminary breath test investigative tool to
determine if Nicolescu was over the legal limit." (Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress,
dated July 25, 2011, p. 10 (emphasis added).)
Finally, the Ferriera court noted, in opting not to follow Oregon and Colorado precedent,
that there was a dual purpose of roadside field sobriety testing:
[T]o either confirm or dispel the police officer's suspicion that the driver
is operating his or her motor vehicle contrary to the law. Thus, if the
8
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individual performs the field sobriety tests in such a manner as to dispel
the officer's suspicions, absent other unique circumstances, the driver will
be left to go on his or her way.
Ferriera, 133 Idaho at 481-482, 988 P.2d at 707-708 (emphasis in original). In the instant case,

testimony revealed that had Nicolescu's preliminary blow returned lower than the statutory
threshold of .08, he would not have been arrested. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p. 40, L. 20 through p.
41, L. 6.) This comports with the Ferriera court's duality ofpurpose analysis as well.
Therefore, based on the Ferreira analysis, the preliminary breath test given by Palic in
the instant case is much more like a roadside field sobriety test in every way pertinent to the
determination of whether it qualifies as an investigatory detention rather than a de facto arrest.
As such, the officer need only have formed reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu was driving
under the influence of alcohol prior to administering the preliminary breath test to Nicolescu.
The Court of Appeals has provided guidance in previous case law regarding the standard
ofreasonable suspicion. In State v. Thornley, 141 Idaho 898, 120 P.3d 286 (Ct.App. 2005) the
investigating officer observed that Thomley emitted the strong odor of alcohol as he passed. The
officer confirmed this observation with another officer, then watched as Thomley got into his car
and began to drive away.

The officer then motioned for Thomely to pull over. Thomley

admitted to the officer that he had one beer. Based on the strong odor of alcohol and admission
of alcohol consumption, the officer required Thomley to perform field sobriety tests. ld. at 899,
120 P.3d 286, 287. The court in Thomley held that this set of facts (strong odor and admission
of alcohol consumption) was enough for the officer to form reasonable suspicion. Id. at 900-901
120 P. 3d at 288-289. Based on this precedent, if reasonable suspicion is the correct standard,
then Palic met and exceeded the threshold of reasonable suspicion to have Nicolescu submit to
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the preliminary roadside breath test. Therefore the preliminary breath test was lawful and should
be taken into consideration as part of the basis for requiring Nicolescu to submit to the
evidentiary breath test using the Lifeloc.
E. The Information Available to Palic at the Time he Required the Preliminary Breath
Test Met the Requisite Standard to Allow Him to Conduct the Eventual Evidentiary
Breath Test..
When requiring an evidentiary test, the State's burden to prove an exception to the
warrant requirement does not end at consent. It is also incumbent upon the state to show that
"even ifthe seizure is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it 'must still be
reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding c;ircumstances." State

V.

Diaz, 144 Idaho at

302, 160 P.3d 739 citing State v. Halen,136 Idaho at 833, 41 P.3d at 261 .
Ultimately, after omitting the preliminary breath test from its analysis due to its
determination that such a test was unlawful based on lack of consent, the magistrate ruled that
reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist in this case sufficient to require the defendant
to perform the ultimate evidentiary breath test that was given him, thereby suppressing the
results ofthat test. (Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress dated July 25,2012, p.10.)
Prior to requesting an individual to submit to a breath test, an officer must have
"reasonable grounds" to believe that an individual has been driving under the influence. Idaho
Code§ 18-8002(1). Whether "reasonable gr<?unds" means probable cause, reasonable suspicion,
or something else entirely is not clear in the case law. In State v. Thompson, the court noted that
the State v. Ferreira decision "suggests that the

l~sser

standard of reasonable suspicion might

suffice." 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003). However, the comi in Thompson
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did not actually rule on that issue because it determined the higher standard of probable cause
was met in Thompson's case, making the determination unnecessary. Id.
Even under the more stringent probable cause analysis, Palic had ample probable cause to
require Nicolescu to take a breath test, without the preliminary breath test results, but especially
inclusive of them. State v. Cooper, 119 Idaho 654, 809 P .2d 515 is instructive in this vein. In

State v. Cooper, witnesses reported that the driver of a vehicle (Cooper) rolled her vehicle
coming around Deadman's Curve after travelling at a high rate of speed and losing control. Id.
at 655, 809 P.2d at 515-516. The officer did not speak with Cooper at the scene, but later
received reports from dispatch that one of the medical responders suggested a blood alcohol test
would be appropriate based on the fact she appeared intoxicated. Id. Thereafter other officers
spoke to Cooper at the hospital and noted the odor of alcohol on her person. Noting no other
signs of intoxication at that time they transported Cooper to the sheriff's office and conducted a
breath test. Id. The court in that case found probable cause existed. Id. at 659, 809 P.2d at 515,
520?
Here, Palic made contact with Nicolescu at the request of another officer at the scene,
who indicated a DUI investigation needed to be conducted. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 20-23.) Palic noted
~he

strong odor of alcohol coming from Nicolescu, as well as his bloodshot watery eyes. (Tr., p.

7, Ls. 15-16, 19.) Palic noted Nicolescu was unsteady on his feet and swayed. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1618.) Nicolescu admitted to consuming alcohol. (Tr., p.7, Ls. 19-21.) Palic was able to conduct
one partial standardized field sobriety test, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which Nicolescu
2

The Thompson court overruled the Cooper decision on the basis that Idaho statutes no longer required probable
cause, but did not overrule the fmding that probable cause existed in that case, citing State v. Cooper among others
and indicating that the case(s) were "not instructive because when those cases arose, the statute expressly required
probable cause". State v. Thompson 138 .Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003)

11

000114

I.

failed. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 19-25.) Palic opted not to conduct any further standardized field sobriety
tests due to Nicolescu's condition after having been in an accident. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 7-13.)
Instead, he had Nicolescu submit to a preliminary breath test which indicated Nicolescu had
alcohol in his system (at some level in excess of .08). (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 15-18; p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p.
40, L. 20 throughp. 41, L. 6.)
While many of those observations could be explained away, an officer must base his
decision on the totality ofthe circumstances, State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419
(Ct.App. 2000) and in this case based on applicable case law, probable cause and therefore the
lesser threshold of reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to require Nicolescu to take a
breath test. For this reason, the magistrate court erred in holding that the evidentiary breath test
administered in this case should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Appellant requests the magistrate's Memorandum Decision
Regarding Motion to Suppress be reversed and the case be remanded for further proceedings.
The State requests an oral argument be set upon the convenience of the Court's calendar
prior to issuing a decision in this case.·

BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Nature OfThe Case
This an appeal by the State based upon the Magistrat~'s Memorandum Decision
Regarding Motion to Suppress entered on July 25, 2012 granting Mr. Nicolescu's Motion to
Suppress excluding any and all evidence that was derived from the preliminary breath test and
later obtained as a result thereof

B. Procedural History
Mr. Nicolescu was cited for the misdemeanor charge of Driving Under The Influence of
Alcohol, Idaho Code§ 18-8004 on October 15, 2011.
On October 27, 2011, the undersigned counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and other
pleadings, including an extension of time to file pre-trial motions which the Magistrate Court
granted. On December 5, 2011, Mr. Nicolescu filed his Motion to Suppress and the evidentiary
hearing was held July 2, 2012.
After taking the matter under advisement, The Honorable John Hawley issued his
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress on July 25, 2012, granting Mr.
Nicolsecu's Motion to Suppress. On August 29, 2012, the State filed its Notice of Appeal.
C. Statement o(Facts

On October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to a vehicular accident at the
intersection ofldaho and 16th streets in the city ofBoise. {TR., p. 6, Ll. 2-13). At the scene,
Officer Palic made contact with Kevin Nicolsecu who was one ofthe drivers involved in the

'I

accident. {TR., p. 7, Ll. 3-12).
During the contact, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr.
Nicolescu as he spoke, a belief that Mr. Nicolescu was unsteady on his feet and swaying in a
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stationary stance. Officer Palic noticed that Mr. Nicolescu had red, bloodshot, watery eyes and
Mr. Nicolsecu admitted he had consumed some alcohol that evening. (TR., p. 7, Ll. 13-21).
Officer Palic also noticed that Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech and did not show any
signs of memory impairment. (TR., p. 18, Ll. 1-12).
At that point, Officer Palic asked Mr. Nicolescu to submit to the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (HGN) test. Mr. Nicolescu complied and Officer Palic began to administer the test,
'

;

I

but then had to stop the test because Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was bothering him. Officer Palic
tried to continue the test again, but was only able to get a "partial nystagmus test" "cause it
was clearly bothering him." (TR., p. 9, Ll1-12) (Emphasis added).
Officer Palic elected not to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) because of the
adrenaline setting in from the accident. Officer Palic felt that because of the adrenaline, going
forward with other FSTs would have "clearly" affected his performance on them. (TR., p. 10,
Ll. 2-13, p. 18, Ll. 13-15). On cross-examination, when asked why he elected not to administer
any further FSTs, Officer Palic responded:
Again, it was to benefit Mr. Nicolescu. I could tell he was obviously-- the
adrenaline was starting to kick in from the collision; I could just tell that just
based on how he was standing, you could see him physically shaking. So, to give
him the benefit of the doubt, I was not going to make him go through those,
'cause clearly he would have met decision points and it would have been
much harder to determine, okay, is that the result of him and adrenaline.

_J

(Tr., p. 18, Ll. 16-25) (Emphasis added).
At this point, Officer Palic decided to administer a preliminary breath test with the AlcoSensor which test result exceeded .08. (TR., p. 10, Ll. 14-16, p. 40, Ll. 9-25, p. 41, Ll. 1-10).
Based on the results from the preliminary breath test, Officer Palic and Officer Moore continued
their investigation and then proceeded to observe the 15 minute wait period, read him the ALS
form, check the Lifeloc device and administer two additional breath samples. (TR., p. 11, Ll. 24-
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25, p. 12, Ll. 1-14, p. 34, Ll. 7-14, p. 41, Ll. 2-10).
On cross-examination, Officer Palic noted that Mr. Nicolescu had cuts and abrasions to
his face as a result ofhis air bag deploying from the accident and acknowledged that it was
reasonable to conclude that dust and debris from the deployment of an air bag would give the
appearance of someone having glassy and bloodshot eyes. (TR., p. 13, Ll. 20-25, p. 14, Ll. 1-

18).
Both Officer Palic and Officer Moore, Palic's supervisor, acknowledged when
administering an evidentiary test, it is mandatory procedure to wait 15 minutes before
administering the test. (TR., p. 19, Ll. 10-25, p. 20, L. 1, p. 35, Ll. 12-25, p. 36, L. 1). When
Officer Palic decided to administer the preliminary test, he admitted that he did conduct the
mandatory 15 minute wait period. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 2-5).
Officers Palic and Moore testified that they were unaware of any statutory authority or
any rules or regulations that governed administering a preliminary test. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 9-25, p.
33, Ll. 2-25, p. 34, Ll. 1-2).
Officer Palic stated that he would have placed Mr. Nicolescu regardless of the
preliminary breath test. (TR., p. 10, Ll. 19-25, p. 11, Ll. 1-4). However, Officer Moore's
testimony clearly contradicted Officer Palic's opinion. When asked, Officer Moore, as his
supervisor, responded as follows:
By Mr. Guerricabeitia:
Q. IfMr. Nicolsecu had blown a- -under a .08, would he have been
arrested?
A. No.
By Ms. Miller:
Q. When you say he would not have been arrested had he blown under a
.08, are you talking about the evidentiary test that you did?
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A. No. InQ. AreyouA. - regards to the presumptive. I - I call it a presumptive test rather than
a preliminary test.
Q. Okay. And so, you're saying that if he would have blown under the
.08 for- oh, I guessA. Using the ALCO-SENSOR, had that been under the .08, no, I don't
believe we would have proceeded any further with it.
Q. Even given the other observations that you made?
A. More than likely yes, that would have not happened.
(TR., p. 40, Ll. 9-11 and 20-25, p. 41, Ll. 1-10).
Officer Moore corroborates his conclusion, noting that he has on occasion relied on the
results of a preliminary breath test to support his belief despite acknowledging the results
produced by the ALCO-SENSOR are not accurate or certified by the State. (TR., p. 37, Ll. 1125, p. 38, L. 1). His response to the prosecutor's question on re-direct further corroborates that
without the preliminary breath test, Mr. Nicolescu would not been arrested on the suspicion of
driving under the influence:

Q. And when you are giving a preliminary breath test, what is it that you're
interested in obtaining from the test?
A. Typically, it's for the purpose of showing that he is consuming alcohol andand sometimes, you know, where he's at as far as the amount of alcohol in his
system.
Q. Okay. Are you interested in the specific number in thatA. NotQ. -event?
A. -not necessarily, no.
(TR., p. 39, Ll. 14-25) (Emphasis added).

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the Magistrate Court's decision in granting Mr. Nicolsecu's Motion to Suppress
excluding any and all evidence, including incriminating statements, that were derived from the
preliminary breath test and later discovered as a result of said breath test was proper and in
accordance with law.
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

On appeal from a trial court's order resolving a motion to suppress evidence, the
appellate defers to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence,
but freely reviews the trial court's determination and application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences vested in the trial court." State v.
Leclercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (App.2010).

B. The Magistrate's Decision to suppress the evidence that derived and flowed from
the preliminary breath test was proper.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d
908, 917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the state can prove
J

that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006).

Consent is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532
(App. 2000).
In Zavala, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the standard of review to be applied in
evaluating a warrantless search pursuant to consent as follows:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8

000124

The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the
circumstances. (Citation omitted). The state has the heavy burden to prove that
consent was given freely and voluntarily. (Citation omitted). The state must
show that consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or
implied. (Citations omitted). If the district court determines that Zavala's consent
was involuntary, then the evidence seized from the vehicle must be suppressed.

Zavala, 134 Idaho at 536.
Applying the foregoing standard, the Magistrate Court held:
In this case the evidence demonstrates that Nicolescu was not given the choice to
submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told that he was
going to have to blow into a device. There was no explanation that he did not
have to submit to the preliminary test and that if he declined it wouldn't be used
against him. There is no indication that the preliminary breath test was "offered"
to Nicolescu. Nicolescu was simply told that he would blow into a device. The
State must show consent was given freely and voluntarily. In this case Nicolescu
acquiesced when he was told he was going to blow into a device. Mere
submission to lawful authority does not equate to consent, rather valid consent
must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and intelligently given. U.S. v.
Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 275 (lOth Vir.1993) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 [1983]). Nicolescu was never offered a
choice. Rather he was simply told he was going to blow into a device.

See, Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress filed July 25, 2012 at 8-9.
The State commences its first argument on the presumption that if a preliminary breath
test is an evidentiary test for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, Idaho Code § 18-8002(1)
does not require consent under the analysis by the Magistrate because it is implied in the
language of the statute.
Idaho Code § 18-1 002(1) reads:
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a
peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.
(Emphasis added).
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The State cites several Idaho cases for the proposition that the language ofldaho Code§
18-8002(1) satisfies the consent exception for a warrantless search, thus the Magistrate's
analysis and decision to suppress the evidence derived from the preliminary breath test was an
error oflaw. Although it appears that the cases cited by the State support its proposition
concerning whether consent was given in this case, it fails to address the prerequisite for which
consent referenced in the statute is triggered to the facts of this case.
In other words, the statute provides that a driver gives his consent to any evidentiary
testing, so long as the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
operating a vehicle in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Here, Mr. Nicolescu was charged
with a violation ofldaho Code § 18-8004.
The issue before the Magistrate and the basis of the motion for suppression was whether
an officer can require an individual to submit to a preliminary evidentiary test to substantiate
probable cause or reasonable suspicion for an arrest is an issue of first impression. It is unclear
what the standard is for an officer's administration of evidentiary testing because the Courts in
this state have yet to decide this issue.
Although Idaho Courts have yet to determine the proper standard, whether it is
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, for an officer to request a breath test, it appears that the
standard for evidentiary. testing is something more than reasonable suspicion.
In Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated that it is not clear that probable cause is the correct standard for an
officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test, even though the defendant and the state
agreed that it was the applicable prerequisite. Because the higher standard of probable cause was
satisfied in this instance, the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue. Probable cause
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existed here where the officer observed the defendant speeding, detected a strong odor of alcohol
on his breath, observed bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, was aware that the defendant refused
to take field sobriety tests, and had reason to believe the defendant lied when he stated that he
had not been drinking.

Collectively, these circumstances supported the officer's reasonable

belief that the defendant was driving while under the influence. Id.
The Court of Appeals further stated in Thompson that its decision in State v. Ferreira,
133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), where it held that officers may administer field
sobriety tests based on reasonable suspicion, suggests that the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion may suffice for an officer's administering of evidentiary tests. Id. However, field
sobriety tests and evidentiary tests are not synonymous. An evidentiary test is the testing of
blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence and/or concentration of
intoxicating substances in a person.

1:c.

§ 18-8002A(e). Since the lesser standard applies to

field sobriety tests, it appears that something more than reasonable suspicion is required for an
officer to administer evidentiary testing.
Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court ofldaho
has stated:
When reviewing an officer's actions the court must judge the facts against an objective
standard. That is, ''would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
search warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate." Because the facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed
from an objective standpoint, the officer's subjective beliefs concerning that
determination are not material.
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996).

Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982, P.2d 954, 959
(Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and "must
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yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or
has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782
(Ct. App. 2004).
Generally, cases in Idaho that involve probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion to
perform field sobriety tests require more evidence that just the odor of alcohol and admission of
drinking as evidence of alcohol or drug use in violation ofldaho Code § 18-8004. See State v.

Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that probable
cause existed to arrest the defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, has
glassy and bloodshot eyes, seemed confused, and failed the field sobriety tests); State v. Buell,
145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 2008) (probable cause existed for arrest where defendant
lost footing when exiting vehicle, admitted to consuming alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests);

State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that
probable cause existed to arrest the defendant where the defendant had difficulty speaking and
standing, he smelled of alcohol, he had watery eyes, urine-soaked trousers, an agitated attitude,
and failed field sobriety tests).
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a positive HGN test in conjunction
with other field sobriety tests may supply probable cause for arrest, but standing alone does not
provide proof positive of driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho
878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991); cf. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999)
(defendant failed HGN test, one-leg stand test, and heel-toe walking test).
In the instant case, Officer Palic admits he was only able to get a partial nystagmus test
and during the test he could tell Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was clearly bothering him. (TR., p. 9,
Ll. 1-4 and 10-12). In this case, the HGN test performed was not complete and conducted to an
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individual with an eye injury.
Officer Palic acknowledged that dust and debris from the deployment of the airbag was a
reasonable conclusion for why Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were red, bloodshot and glassy. See id.,
supra. Officer Palic noted that he observed no slurred speech or memory impairment from Mr.

Nicolescu. Officer Palic, also, noticed that Mr. Nicolescu was shaking due to the adrenaline
kicking in from the accident. (TR., p. 18, Ll. 17-21).
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Palic did not have the requisite
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Mr. Nicolescu's arrest absent the results of the
preliminary breath test. Even if the officer only needed to satisfy the lesser standard, reasonable
suspicion, in order to arrest Mr. Nicolescu and administer further evidentiary testing, the statute
does not authorize administering a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate probable
cause to arrest and administer more evidentiary tests. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause
must exist before an officer may administer evidentiary tests.
Officer Palic detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. Nicolescu's breath, and Mr. Nicolescu
admitted to drinking alcohol that night. Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech, and did not
show signs of impaired memory. The officer performed a partial HGN test on Mr. Nicolescu but
was unable to finish because Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were bothering him. Mr. Nicolescu had just
been in a collision accident, for which he was not at fault for, and debris had gotten into his eyes
which was the reason that Mr. Nicolescu's eyes appeared red, glassy and bloodshot to the officer.
The officer, not Mr. Nicolescu, elected not to continue performing the other field sobriety tests.
At this point, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr.
Nicolescu and administer any evidentiary tests.

It was only then Officer Palic decided to

administer the preliminary breath test, an evidentiary test, to determine whether further
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evidentiary tests should be conducted, only the latter tests would be conducted with a device that
satisfies the requirements by statute and ISP's rules and regulations to be admissible at trial.
The only reason which Officer Palic provided when asked why administer a preliminary
breath test if it is only used to detect the presence of alcohol when Mr. Nicolescu already
admitted to drinking that evening and Officer Palic could smell it was nothing prohibited him
from doing so. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 9-13).

Q. Okay. You testified earlier that -that you believed you had enough
information to- to arrest Mr. Nicolescu regardless of the preliminary breath test;
is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. I guess I'm going to ask why, then, have him submit to a preliminary breath
test?
A. I guess my question to you would be why not? Again, it's another tool that's
allowed to me, that I can use.
(TR., p. 26, Ll. 24-25, p.27, Ll. 1-8).
The same was true for Officer Moore:
Q. So, why administer a preliminary breath test, that there was no need to, to test
- for determination of or detecting alcohol in his system.
A. Well, some officers do it, some don't. I- I don't personally like doing it, but
some officers do and there's no- nothing that says we can't. ..
(TR., p. 35, Ll. 5-10).
Based on their testimony, it was obvious and the Magistrate could reasonably infer from
the testimony that Officer Palic administered the preliminary breath test for the sole purpose of
determining whether any reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Nicolescu
for driving under the influence.
"In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion ofDUI prior to administering the preliminary
test. However, Palic's comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as to whether
Nicolescu was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu that after the
preliminary breath test he would make his determination from there." See,
Memorandum Decision Regarding Notion to Suppress filed July 25, 2012 at 7.
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(Emphasis added).
The Magistrate is vested with the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences. See, State v. Leclercq, supra.
The Magistrate, also, held that the AlcoSensor test "clearly does not meet statutory
requirements for admission of a breath test under I. C. 18-8004(4). It is not certified or
performance verified. In this case where standard FSTs could not be utilized Palic used the
AlcoSensor for a preliminary breath test to determine ifNicolescu should be investigated further
or released." See, Memorandum at 6.
Officer Palic admitted that he did not observe the 15 minute period prior to administering
the preliminary breath test. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 2-5). Several Idaho appellate cases have held that
an adequate foundation must be established to admit BAC results. See, State v. Utz, 125 Idaho
127, 867 P.2d 1001 (App.1993) (failure to closely observe the individual during the 15 minute
period); State v. Defranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (App.2006) (officer failed to monitor
defendant for continuous 15 minute period immediately preceding test); State v. Remsburg, 126
Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225
(Ct.App.1999).
Although the foregoing cases are not directly on point with the issue of whether an
evidentiary test can be used as the basis to supply an officer with probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, the cases are instructive to support the proposition.
The Magistrate held:
Without the preliminary breath test the officer did not have the necessary
reasonable and articulable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further
evidentiary testing. See, Memorandum at p. 10.
The Magistrate's holding is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
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record, specifically, the testimony of Officer Moore who was at the scene to evaluate Officer
Palic's investigation, where he testified that they (law enforcement officers) sometimes use the
results of Alco-Sensor to determine whether to continue an investigation and in this case, had the
preliminary breath test results been under .08, no further investigation would have been
conducted.
Even if this Court finds that the Magistrate's reasoning on "consent" to render its
decision was incorrect, this Court can still sustain the ruling upon a proper theory. State v.

Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 602, 237 P.3d 1222 (App.2010) ("Where a ruling in a criminal case is
correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal
theory."). Here, the officers did not have sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
administer an evidentiary test.

C. The Preliminary Breath Test is an Evidentiary Test under the Statute.
In the alternative, the State takes the position that a preliminary breath test is not an
evidentiary breath test for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis or Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ).
The State attempts to equate the preliminary breath test as another form of field sobriety testing.
At the hearing, Officer Moore testified that a distinction exists between a preliminary
breath test and an evidentiary test. Officer Moore's opinion of the distinction was that for a
breath test to be an evidentiary test the results must comply with the State's rules and
regulations, the machine has been checked, calibrated and verified, the individual is given his
ALS Advisory rights etc. . . In essence, the evidence produced can be used and offered as proof

in a trial. (TR., p. 34, Ll. 3-24, p. 35, Ll. 1-25, p. 36, Ll. 1-25, p. 37, Ll. 125, p. 38, L. 1).
However, a preliminary or as he referred to as a ''presumptive test," is typically used to
detect the presence of alcohol only and the results therefrom do not comply with State rules and
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regulations nor used as evidence or proof in a trial. See id. However, Officer Moore did
acknowledge that he has on occasion used the results of a ''presumptive" breath test to "check
and see where they're at, as far as (unintelligible) a performance verification on them, and
they're typically very close to what they should be." (TR., p. 37, Ll. 19-21). Again, had Mr.
Nicolescu blown under .08 on the preliminary breath test, no further investigation would have
taken place. (TR., p. 41, Ll. 2-10).
Idaho Code § 18-8002 titled "Tests of driver for alcohol concentration, presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances- Suspension upon refusal of tests" defines an evidentiary test as
follows:
(9) For purposes of this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, "evidentiary
testing" shall mean a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests, including
the additional test authorized in subsection (10) ofthis section, utilized to
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances in a person.
Subsection 10 of§ 18-8002 states:
A person who submits to a breath test for alcohol concentration, as defined in
subsection (4) of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, may also be requested to submit to
a second evidentiary test ofblood or urine for the purpose of determining the
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances if the peace officer has
reasonable cause to believe that a person was driving under the influence of any
drug or intoxicating substance or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug
or intoxicating substance.

·See also, Idaho Code § 18-8002A.
Nowhere under the Idaho Code expresses that a preliminary or "presumptive" breath test
is different and distinct from an evidentiary breath test because the latter may be offered as
evidence at trial. From the statutory language, it is clear that an evidentiary test is any breath,
urine or blood test used to determine the presence and/or concentration of alcohol in a person.
The State's distinction between a preliminary versus an evidentiary breath test is unfounded.
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The State argues that the standard set forth in Ferriera, supra., where an officer need
only reasonable articulable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests should apply in this case
with regards to the use of the preliminary breath test. As expressed above, there is no distinction
by statute between a preliminary breath test and an evidentiary test.
As discussed above, the Thompson Court was presented with the very issue before this
Court and elected not to making a ruling on the issue because either standard was met based on
the facts of the case. "The present case, however, is not one that requires resolution of this
narrow issue, for even assuming that probable cause sufficient to support an arrest is the correct
standard to be applied, we hold that the standard is satisfied here." Thompson, 138 Idaho at 515.
The State argues in support of one of the factors set forth in Pereira, supra., that the
preliminary breath test is equivalent to an FST because the preliminary test was conducted on the
side ofthe road. The State ignores the fact that the breath tests conducted with the Lifeloc were
done in the back of the patrol car at the scene or in the "field" as well.
The distinction between FSTs and evidentiary tests, whether preliminary or not, is that
FSTs are not conclusive nor measure the concentration level of alcohol in an individual's system
to determine whether a violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004 has occurred. In order to determine
the concentration level or BAC level, an evidentiary test of breath, blood or urine must be
administered which calculates and measures the concentration level in the system.
Here, Officer Moore admitted that the results from "presumptive" test are used, even
though they are not State certified but ''they're close." (TR., p. 37, Ll. 11-25, p. 38, L. 1).
Without the preliminary breath test, Officer Palic did not have probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to have Mr. Nicolescu submit to another evidentiary test. The purpose for the
preliminary breath test was simply because Officer Palic had a "hunch."
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Based on the statutory language and arguments above, the State's contention that a
preliminary test is akin to an FST is without merit.

V. CONCLUSION
To allow officers to administer a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate
reasonable suspicion or probable cause would render an individual's constitutional right under
the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures in a DUI context illusory.
Furthermore, if the standard to administer an evidentiary test is the lesser standard of reasonable
and articulable suspicion, then probable cause does not exist in a DUI context.
Officers, on mere hunches, suspecting an individual is operating a vehicle under the
influence could simply demand the individual to submit to a preliminary breath test to form the
officer's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Field Sobriety Tests would be irrelevant, and
if administered would result in biased observations of officers to support an arrest.
The practice of administering a preliminary evidentiary test creates a slippery slope
between an individual's constitutional rights and the state's legitimate interest for the safety of
others, which practice can be fraught with abuse by officers.
If such practice is desired in the State ofldaho, the statute should be amended to allow
for the practice which requires legislative action, not judicially reformation.
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority and arguments above, Mr. Nicolescu
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision Regarding
Motion to Suppress.
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DATED this 21st day ofDecember, 2012.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
ED GUERRICABEITIA, ofthe firm
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant
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true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
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Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City Attorney,
and hereby files its Reply Brief in the above-captioned matter.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction.
On appeal the State asserts that a preliminary breath test should be treated similarly to

other field sobriety tests and that an officer must only have reasonable suspicion of DUI prior to
administering a preliminary breath test. In the alternative, the State asserts that if the preliminary
breath test is held to a higher standard ofprobable cause, in this case, probable cause existed to
ask Defendant/Respondent, Kevin Michael Nicolescu (hereafter "Nicolescu) to submit to the
breath test. Nicolescu misconstrues the State's argument, asserts that the preliminary breath test
was an evidentiary test subject to Idaho Code § 18-8002, that the preliminary breath test results
are not admissible at trial, and that Officer Palic was acting on a mere hunch when he required
Nicolescu to submit to the preliminary breath test and therefore did not have reasonable
suspicion.

B.

Preliminary Breath Tests is an Investigatory Detention Much Like Field Sobriety
Tests, Rather than a de (acto Arrest.
Officer Moore testified in response to Nicolescu's questions regarding the procedural

differences from an officer's standpoint in using what he termed a "presumptive test" (referred to
herein as "preliminary breath test") and an "evidentiary test" pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002.
(Tr., p. 34, L. 3 through p. 38, L.l). Nicolescu asserts this testimonial distinction is the State's
argument. (Resp't Br., pp. 16-17)
Procedurally, officers treat evidentiary tests the State can admit into evidence at trial
much differently than tests they are using for their own investigations. For what Officer Moore
1
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distinguished as an evidentiary test, officers use a state-certified instrument and follow all statecertified-standard operating procedures. (Tr., p. 36, L. 25 through p. 37, L. 10). For preliminary
breath tests not intended for introduction at trial, but rather intended for an officer to use as part
of his or her investigation, officers use a different instrument that has not gone through state
certification, and the officers do not follow the state certified standard operating procedures
when administering it. (Tr., p. 38, L. 11 through p. 39, L. 9). ·
The State does not argue that the mere fact the preliminary breath test is not administered
in accordance with the statutory requirements for automatic admissibility at jury trial makes it on
par with a field sobriety test (FST).

Rather, the

~tate

has based its argument on the

characteristics making an FS T an. investigatory detention rather than de facto arrests set forth in
Idaho case law.

State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, 480, 988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct.App. 1999)

(Appellant's Br., pp. 6-9.) However, the distinctions made by Officer Moore do support that
argument. It is clear from the case law and based on common sense, that there is a significant
difference between handcuffing someone and placing them in the back of a patrol vehicle to wait
for 15 minutes before administration of an evidentiary breath test, and standing next to their
vehicle on the side of the road with freedom of movement contemporaneous with a traffic stop.

!d.
And while FSTs do not require handcuffing, transport in a police car, or a 15-minute
waiting period, making them investigatory detentions as explained in Appellant's Brief, they do
require performance of a series of divided attention tests that take time and effort on the part of
the detainee. In comparison, a preliminary exhale into an instrument contemporaneous with a
traffic stop is only slightly less convenient than breathing. In the instant case, the officer made

2
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contact with the driver of a Vehicle involved in an accident, as part of the accident investigation.
(Tr., p. 6, L.lO through p.7, L.12) The preliminary breath test was not only contemporaneous
with the FSTs, but based on the unique circumstances, was given in place of them, requiring no
greater length in detainment (Tr., p. 10, .L. 2 through p. 11, L. 19) and likely resulting in a shorter
period of detainment.
For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary breath test administered in the instant case was
in.fact ari investigatory detention.
C.

Because the Preliminary Breath Test is an Investigatory Detention, it Does Not
Require the Permissive Language of Idaho Code§ 18-8002
Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) allows for evidentiary testing in DUI investigations based on ·
'

the determination that drivers in Idaho are deemed to have consented to such testing. This
statute is the means by which law enforcement officers are excepted from the warrant
requirement, where they administer a breath, urine, or blood test for the concentration of alcohol
or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ); State v.

Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741; State v. Cooper 136 Idaho 697, 699, 39 P.3d 637,
639 (Ct. App. 2001).
Defense argues that Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) makes it "clear that an evidentiary test is
any breath, urine, or blood test used to determine the presence and/or concentration of alcohol in
a person," and that this necessarily means Idaho Code § 18-8002 is the controlling statute.
(Resp't Br., p. 17 (emphasis in original)) However, if you read Idaho Code§ 18-8002(9) in its
entirety, it is clear that is not the case. It reads,

For the pwposes of this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, "evidentiary
testing" shall mean a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests, including
the additional test authorized in subsection (1 0) of this section, utilized to
3
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determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances in a person.
(emphasis added). Idaho Code § 18-8002A(e) reads in part,
Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw or rule of court, the results of any test
for alcohol · concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated and approved
by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state
police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a· witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.
The plain language of Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) indicates that the definition of
evidentiary testing is only applicable for purposes of Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A.
Just because a section of Idaho Code seeks to define the word "evidentiary testing" for its own
purposes, does not mean that any time any breath test is conducted in the state of Idaho, § 188002 is controlling. And it is clear from the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-8002A(e), its
purpose is not to limit law enforcement in the collection of evidence in DUI investigations, but
rather to streamline the process of admission of breath test results at trial provided the conditions
of Idaho Code § 18-8002A(e) are met.
The intention of Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A is to allow for a de facto arrest
for evidentiary testing without a warrant and to provide for ease of admissibility of the test where
certain conditions are met. But where a de facto arrest has not occurred, Idaho Code § 18-8002
need not apply.

D.

Admissibility at Trial is Irrelevant to Whether Evidence can be Collected.
Nicolescu cites several cases establishing that adequate foundation must be laid in order

to admit BAC results at trial. (Resp't Br., p. 15) It appears this argument was made in support
of the suppression of the preliminary breath test in the instant case based on the State's presumed
4
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inability to lay proper foundation for it.

The State is unaware of, and Nicolescu has not

provided, any authority supporting the claim that the admissibility of a piece of evidence at trial
has any bearing on whether officers can collect such evidence during the investigation of a
potential crime. There are many examples of information officers use in investigation of a crime
that are not intended for admission at trial. Examples include unsworn statements, NIK narcotic
field testing, and polygraph results. Therefore, the State fails to see the relevance of these cases,
but concedes that if the State were to attempt to admit any evidentiary tests at trial, it would
expect to be required to lay proper foundation for those results.
E.

The Requisite Standard for Administration of the Breath Test was Met.

'·

Nicol:escu contends that in its Appellant's Brief the State failed to "address the prerequisite
for which consent referenced in the statute is triggered to the facts of this case," being that the
"officer has reasonable· grounds to believe that the person was operating a vehicle in
violation of Idaho Code§ 18-8004". (Resp't Br., p. 10 (emphasis in original)) While the State
maintains that the preliminary breath test is not subject to Idaho Code § 18-8002 as it was part of
an investigatory detention, the State did in fact address the "reasonable grounds" requirement in
section "E." of its Appellant's Brief, and reasserts the arguments and case law authority cited
therein. (Appellant's Br., pp. 10-12.) If it was previously unclear in its Appellant's Brief, it is
the State's ultimate argument that whether this Court finds that the preliminary breath test in the
instant case amounts to an investigatory detention, requiring the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion, (see, e.g., State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, 480-481, 988 P.2d 700, 706-707 (Ct.App ..
1999)), or that it was an evidentiary test pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002 and requires either
reasonable suspicion, probable cause or something in between (see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 138

..
5
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Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003)), the facts in this case support the finding that
both have been met. Therefore, not only should the preliminary breath test be considered as part
of the officers' reasonable basis for administering the ultimate evidentiary test, but even
excluding the preliminary breath test, the officers met the requisite standard to administer the
ultimate breath test, and the results therefrom should not be suppressed.
Nicolescu has cited several cases wherein probable cause was found to have existed in DUI
investigations as support for his contention that more than just odor of alcohol and admission to
drinking alcohol is required for either the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion standard.
(Resp't Br., p.12) However, such a conclusion does not logically follow, and Nicolescu has
misconstrued the facts of this case with regard to the officer's observations prior to the
administration of the breath test.
In the instant case, Officer Palic had administered a partial horizontal gaze nystagmus test
(HGN) wherein Nicolescu failed even prior to completion of that test (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-6), he
observed a very strong odor of alcohol coming from Nicolescu's breath, and noticed that
Nicolescu had a severe sway, and bloodshot, watery eyes. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-19) Additionally,
Nicolescu admitted to having consumed alcohol. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 19-21) This is more than mere
odor of alcohol and admission to drinking. In addition, the State has supplied Idaho case law
wherein no more than the strong odor of alcohol was reasonable suspicion enough to pull
someone over and require performance of field sobriety tests (State v. Thornley, 141 'Idaho 898,
900-901, 120 P.3d 286, 288-289 (Ct.App. 2005)). Therefore it does logically follow that at the
very least, reasonable suspicion existed in the instant case wherein Officer Palic had several
other indicia of intoxication.

6
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments, the Appellant requests the Court reverse the
magistrate's decision and remand the case for further proceedings.

DATED this

_'1-=----- day of January 2013.
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
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. 1.~Fstf3'5"F>'rviTJucf9'e. . . . . . . . . . .ffi1i's. 'is. tra·iTi. .a. .memo. d'e.ci's.ioi1. .a.il'd. .a.rCie.r. ¥ra·iTi. 'J'u·a9·e. Rawiey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
!
!suppressing evidence obtained in a case involving a DUI arrest that
l

1

!
1

l

!
~
~
. . .f:'02·:·4'9. .r.rvi. .IJiJCi9e. . . . . . . . . . .tFi'e. state. ca.ilteil.Cis. .ii1at"whe.il. .ya'i:i. .9.efa. i5C.yo'l:i. .coi1sei1fto. ie.siii19·:. . . . . .
l
!The PBT is part of the testing that can be involved in this type of
'

1

l

!situation and that other evidence should not have been suppressed.
!Did the officer say he was unsure

f~~;~~m~~~~~~:=!~~~~~~r:;~#}~~~J~~f~~~:========:====::

. . f.o£i':'43. .r'f\il. "t'Ms. . .rv1iTier. . . . .tTi1e. ma9·istraie. .c.a·u·ii"Ci'icfi1ot"cai15i'd·e;·r. a.ii. .a'fii1e. ia"Cta.rs. whe.i1. comTil.9. .
I

Ito their conclusion and that case law is clear. Reasonable suspicion.

i

i

1
!

jof the defendant. He stated he had not hit his head and had been
!medically cleared. Unsteady on his feet, blood shot watery eyes,
lfailed the HGN .

. . .f:'OEF22. .r.rv1. . bua9·e. . . . . . . . . . .tAd'm'is.s'ioi1. ara;:rilkii19.?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .f:'0£3':'2'9. .r'Kil"'t'rv1s:. . rv1ii'ier. . . . .t.i. 'h·a·ve. .a. 'ii'8f"i. .wiTi. r:e·a·c:rth.ra·u-9'h. .ii1af:. fi1e. Cieie.il'Ci·a·ilrwas. Cirivi'i1·9·:. ·ir. . . . .
l
!was 2am, there was a strong odor of alcohol coming from the breath
l

. . .f:.oa·:·34. .r'Ki1"'tJuCi9e. . . . . . . . . . .h::re. haCi. a. scratci1eCi. corn·e·a·:. ·;;dha·t;s. iNFiai"i"th.ou9Fifi".reaa·:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

=====:::::
. . .f.1"1":'32. .r.rvi. .Hili's·:. .MiTier. . . . .!fi1e. state. Ci'iCi"i1ai"i 1te·r;a. ·c;·il. .aCimi'tti'i1'9"Ti¥e'ioci<. .res·u·ii5'Til.io. eviCie·r;·c;e;·:. . . . .

:r~{~~~~i~~~~~ =r~a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!=====
l

!

!Presumptive test, something to help form a picture but not an
!evidentiary test.

l

lconsent to evidentiary testing? Or not?

l

jHunter case, that is informative in the s,ense that PC was found in
1that case. Ask to reverse the trial court and remand the case.

. . .r.1·:z·:·a7. .r.rv1. . lJuCi9e. . . .:. . . . . . .fwh·e·ii. ii1at"te.st. .it"aCim.ii1i.ste.reCi. .i.ts. .r;·a·rt. .arti1e. statute. Ta·~aoo2. ff)"'you. .
. . .r·1·:z·:'36. .r.rv1"'TM·s·:. ·rv1me·r. . . . .fit. .c.a·u·ia. 9·a. .eiih'e.r. wai. Usis. .i=adors:. ·J\r:9·u·m·ei1C'tS"eds.io·r;·"ii1. tFie. . . . . . . . . . .
1

i
~
................................................1.........................................1.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1:17:59 PM \Judge
iState vs. Cooper, State vs. Ferraira, State vs. Thornley were all
~
!cited .
lJ\i·c;·c;·~s-eil·s·c;·;:

. . f.1·a·:·33. .r.rvi. lrv1·r:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. ae;vrc·e. ih'afTs. .li.suaiTy-to. Ciete·c:£t'i1.e. .P'resei1ce. ofa'icohor:. . .

\Guerricabeit\Reads from decision of Hawley.

Ha
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Judge Mclaughlin Clerk: A. Lycan
1:20:47 PM !Judge
·

I

Reporter: Mia Martorelli

4-3-13

Courtroom501

!Lets take this hypothetically, there is an accident, one of the drivers
!is interviewed by a peace officer, deployed air bag, strong odor of
!alcohol and they admit to drinking or consuming alcohol .

. . .f.2i.3'5'. F>.Kil. TM·r:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .lrt1e. officer··c;a·il. .rei.y. o·;;. .c;.rearb'miy:. .J"usf's.imp.iy. admTs5To.n. .iiri·;:r5·rr;·e;iror
!Guerricabeitjalcohol doesn't rise to the level of suspicion.
~ ia ·
~

. . . . . . . . . . .!rh"ere. .was. .a.n. horizontai""9aie. .tesf·ar;···th"e···9·c;·aa··eye··c;·c;·rr:ea?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .r·2~F3'3. .F>.rv1. . Uvfr:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .frt1at"I5. .r;.eiio.rmea. o·il. .ho.ti1. .eye·s·. arth"e. same. fime·:. rh"e. i'ssue. Is. . . . . . . . . . . .
····r·2~fs9···F>·Kil···tJ"ua9e

!Guerricabeit !whether or not the officer had reasonable suspicion before the
!ia
!administration of the test. The result is when he had his suspicion,
!
!not before that. Cites case. I don't challenge the consent issue, that
!
!is what Judge Hawley used for his decision.
i
i .

. . .f.27":·3·1. . F>.Kil. .bua9e. . . . . . . . . . .tso·. ya'LJ. ti'e"ii"e.ve"J'ua9·e. .RaiN'iey. was. .il.o't"erroneo"i.J·s. i·il. .co.mTil.9. "fo. th"e. . . . . .
!
!decision he did .
. . .r·2:r4·9. .F>.Kil. TKAr:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .lwh"at"stops
. .o#i·c;·e·rs. .is. ti1e. 4iii. .a.m·ename.nf'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
!Guerricabeit!
!ia
. . .f:-3cEo2. . F>.Ki1. .1"Jud9.e
. . . . . . . . . . .!
. .iro·rr;. .tra·;;5cr.ipt". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .f.3cE5.if'F>.Kil . TM·r:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .H. aoil.ifheHeve. .ti1.e"Tli.a9·e. r9·r;·or:ed. ti1.a"t:. .th"ai'ie.st"imo.ily.Ts. 2.6Ri6. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
t'i~eaas

!Guerricabeit!hindsight. Page 20, lines 9-13. That's the basis of the decision.

Ha
i
. . .f.33·:·3~rF>·M· . ·tJ"ud.9e. . . . . . . . . . .t.i"d·ia·il;f's.ee. a. ta·r;·e·. recordh19·;. did. h"e. .co.nsi'd'er. that?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .f.3i'4'9" . F>.Kil. .t'fiA"s·:. .rv1ii'iai. . . . .tfi:ftii.e'Tli.ci'9.es. .req·u·e·sfwe. .provrae·a. ·auaro:. ·irwas. .n.eve·r. ad·;n·iHed. .af. . . . .
!
!the suppression hearing, but afterwards he requested a copy .
. . .f.34·:·23. .F>.Kil. ·t·M"r:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h.wa·5·;;·;reven. awa.re. ofthat:"huf"i'. ii'ave. i1o. .o'b}e"Cti.on:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
!Guerricabeit!
!ia
!

. . .f.34·:-3·s. . F>.Kil. .tiLid9.e. . . . . . . . . . ti. .a.m. .a. i'itiie. concer.iled. .ahout"ti1e. .reco·ra·;. r·i<·il·c;v;;. h"e;. r:ete.rred. to. i'f:'. . . . . . . ..
:

:

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooloooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooloOOooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo••ooooooooO•ooooooooooooooOooo••oooooooooOOOOOnoooO,.Ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo•••oooooooOOOOOoooooo•oooooooo

1:34:51 PM jMr.
jOn page 3 a footnote referenced it, I was not aware that it was
lGuerricabeit!provided and I have no objection.
!ia
i

. . .f.35":T1. . F>"M. .buCi9e. . . . . . . . . . .tTh'e. r:e·ca·ra. r:etie"Cts. th"at. J"ua9e. .R.aiNi'ey. .m.a·d"e. a. r:e·C1·Li·es.fto.Ti5tei1. to. . . . . ..
!
!
\

!the audio tape, the state provided a copy of that audio and the
!defense has no objection to the court considering that as evidence. I
\will need to get that, I need to listen to the tape .

. . .f:.36·:·a3···P·M·. ·t·fiA·r:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .t·c·c;·il·trr;·u·e·s. .a.r9·u·m·e·ilt:". i"'iNiTi"i1oi"repres·e·ni"wh"at"h"e. .sai'Ci. Til. .fh"e. tape·;. .i. . . ..
!Guerricabeit!heard the tape a long time ago.
~ ia
~

:~~~~j~I~~~~~~~g~===~e~~~~r======:=======:==========:=
!Guerricabeit l
!ia
!

. . .1":.39·:·?i1. . .F>.Ki1. .1Iua9·e. . . . . . . . . . .1Ji:.il:Y. evlae·;;·c;ed.h"af'th"e. de¥e·ilaa·nrcaus.e'd'. th"i"s. .a.cdd"e.il"t?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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,'
Judge Mclaughlin Clerk: A. Lycan

1:39:29 PM jMr.

Reporter: Mia Martorelli

4-3-13

Courtroom501

jNot that I'm aware of, I believe he was the one that got t-boned.

~ Guerricabeit I

lia

l

·····r·3g-:·4·9···P·M··tJucf9·e;····................"twa·s··ihe···afi1er··ari"\ie·r·Til]"lj.r8CI?·················································. ····································. · · · · . ···············................
·····r·3!i:·5·6···P·M··Tr;ir:..............................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
Tra·m···nai".awa.re·~·····

jG uerricabeit j
lia
!

···T:40":·a;;rF>·rv;····tJ"uCI9e...................tfiA"s:. ··fi.iliTiar:··ya"Li. ha·il·aea··fi1afia·p·e·T;;·?······························. ······································. ·······································
·····f:·46":·1·4···P·M·Tfi.il·s:···iVirfiar. . . . "ffd"Ci. hei"ieve·T·ema·ire·c:raetense··c;auns.eC.................................................................................................
. . .f.4cF3·a····P·M··p"L1a9·e···················Tifis···nafin. fi18. ¥ire········································································. ································...............................................................
· ·. r·4;L0"1····P·M··Trv1"s·~···fi.ilwia·r·. ······nrwas···an. an. e.m·a·ir-a·ffachmenCJ\r9.umenr··············································································. .· · · ·
·····r·4E:E.f1····P·M··pua9·e;····················lrwHi"""fai<e. if·Li·ilaer:··aa·vrs·e·m·enTaiia···is·s·ue···a···c:rec"is.io·;;··wifil.in···1·6··aa·ys···········
·····f:46·:·26···P·M···t. ·······································h~r;a···c;y·c:·a·se·········································································································································································.................
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO
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KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
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Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076
STIPULATION TO. SUPPLEMENT
EVIDENCE IN SUPPRESSION HEARING

Defendant.
__________________________
)
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Assistant City Attorney Sarah A.
Millar, and Defendant, by and through defense counsel Ed Guenicabeitia, and stipulate to the

'•

supplementing of evidence in the suppression hearing, with a copy of the_ officer's audio
identified as State's Exhibit 2.
DATEDthis

r

day of April, 2013~

DATED this

Ed Guerricabeitia
Defense Counsel

q·

day of April, 2013.

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney
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- - - · ..--·--··--·-- ·--------· .. ·-----··---

~--·-----

.

_____

......... --··--. .. '"'-·------·" ..

_____
____ __ ___..
000155
.,

_.

._.

,

;2p8

04-09-13;10:58AM;

#

386 9428

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

_3_ day of April, 2013, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
~USMAIL

.
_INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
_FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING- 2

__

,

__,_ .,-·~ - ...... -·. ···-·····

___ ________ ___ __ -·-----·-··--····· -...
,

,

,

sam
---- -·-·-·· -·· ·- ....

000156

2/

4

NO·---~~--;--,~

A.M.~·---F-IL~.~-~_,_{_·.....;/;j~C,)

APR 0 9 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
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Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney.
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 500
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Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE.
· STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
Defendant.

)
.)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING EVIDENCE
IN SUPPRESSION HEARING

_____________ )
HAVING CONSIDERED the Stipulation to Supplement Evidence in the Suppression
Hearing, this court hereby supplements the evidence with the officer's audio, identified as State's
Exhibit 2.

DATED this

-Z!:_ day of_~!ff'-TJ,...,_~::_::::..~-"""-lo.._ _ _, 2013.

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING EVIDENCE .IN SUPPRESSION
HEARING - 3
.
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Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

STIPULATION AUGMENTING THE
RECORD ON APPEAL

Defendant.
__________________________
)
COMES NOW the State, by and through Assistant City Attorney Sarah A. Millar, and

..

Defendant, by and through defense counsel Ed Guerricabeitia, and stipulate to augment the
record on appeal with State's Exhibit 2.

DATED this

s~

day of April, 2013.

GP~£zt:

DATED this

STIPULATION AUGMENTING THE RECORD ON APPEAL -1

.,,______ _.... _... ·---------- ..

.,

of April, 2013

Sarah A. Millar
Assistant City Attorney

Ed Guerricabeitia
Defense Counsel

..........-------........
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Attorneys at Law
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Telephone: (208) 384-3870
Idaho State Bar No. 7439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

v.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076

ORDER AUGMENTING THE RECORD
ON APPEAL

_____________ )
HAVING CONSIDERED the Stipulation to Augment the Record on Appeal, this court
hereby augments the record with State's Exhibit 2.

DATED this

'llP{hday of _ _._A~'p'-'-r\L-\=-----' 2013.
Hon. Michael McLaughlin ·

ORDER AUGMENTING THE RECORD ON APPEAL- 3
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of April 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to:

Sarah A. Millar
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u.s. Mail

Boise City Prosecutor

Fax Transmission
Hand Delivery

~Interdepartmental Mail
Ed Guerricabeitia

:{2

Notified available for pick up

Davidson, Copple, Copple, & Copple

U.S. Mail

199 N. Capitol Blvd, Suite 600

Fax Transmission

P.O. Box 1583
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Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDI~b'P~~<(,!RJCH, Clork
ByAMVLVCAN
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~01(

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,

Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER: SARAH MILLAR
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: ED GUERRICABEITIA
This case is before the Court on the state's appeal from the decision of the
magistrate, Hon. John T. Hawley, Jr., granting the defendant's (Mr. Nicolescu's)
motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, the magistrate's decision will be
reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following procedural statement is taken from the state's brief and appears
to essentially be undisputed:
On December 5, 2011, Nicolescu filed Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. The State responded with its Brief in
Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc Breath Test Results
filed April 6, 2012. After several continuances, a hearing on
Nicolescu's motion was held July 2, 2012, at 3:30 p.m. After
consideration of testimony and the filings of both parties, the

Memorandum Decision and Order 1
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'r

court issued a written opinion on July 25, 2012, granting the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The State thereafter
concurrently filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion to Hold Matter
in Abeyance on August 29, 2011. Appellant's Brief, at 3.
The magistrate noted the factual findings in his decision:
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu
(Nicolescu) was involved in a two vehicle collision at the
intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise
City Police Officer Ransom responded to the scene. Officer
Chris Palic of the Boise City Police Department then arrived on
the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu.
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded
through a green light west bound on Idaho Street when the
other vehicle northbound on 16th Street apparently ran a red
light and collided with his vehicle. While speaking with
Nicolescu, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that Nicolescu had
red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of
slurred speech or impaired memory. There were some minor
cuts and abrasions to Nicolescu's face, which Palic assumed
were caused by the deployment of the airbag during the
collision. Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic.
Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that
evening. Officer Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. After starting the HGN
test, Officer Palic had scored Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision
points, but did not complete the test due to an injury to
Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a result of the
accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was
kicking in and Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking
and that he was unsteady on his feet.
Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who
was also on the scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had
observed a strong odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes,
that Nicolescu had scored 4 of 6 decision points on the HGN
(which would have been a failure) prior to terminating the test
and that Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol earlier
that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been
caused by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and
it is also possible they resulted from Nicolescu consuming
alcohol or even a combination of both factors. Palic explained
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that he did not want to perform other FSTs because Nicolescu
was visibly shaken by the accident.
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern
because his only contact with Nicolescu was after the
accident. 1 Palic testified that he felt that he had enough
information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI. Palic
testified that based on the totality of the circumstances he told
Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to operate a
motor vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the
discussion between Palic and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic
should continue his investigation to determine if Nicolescu was
safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he might be under
the influence of alcohol. Paramedics on the scene examined
Nicolescu and noted that he had a scratched cornea
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to
continue the HGN test because of the eye injury and because
Nicolescu was shaken up.
Palic then stated: 'What I am going to have you do is blow into
a device (Aicosensor) and we'll just go from there. O.K. and
we'll go from there. I will make my determination from there.'
Nicolescu replied: 'Dude, I'm willing to cooperate however.'
Palic stated: 'It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K.'
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then
continued by explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a
tight seal around the pipe and blow real hard.
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test [PBT] on the
Alco-Sensor, which is a handheld breath alcohol tester. The
Alco-Sensor is not certified and is not performance verified. It is
used to detect the presence of alcohol in individuals. The result
of the preliminary Alco-Sensor test was .1 08 which is over the
legal limit. Officer Palic then handcuffed Nicolescu and placed
him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath samples.
After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS [administrative
license suspension] advisory, using the Lifeloc instrument ...
Nicolescu provided further samples which registered results of
.1 03 and .096. Nicolescu was then cited - not arrested - for
1

Officer Palic was aware that Mr. Nicolescu had been drinking and was involved in an automobile accident, at
or around 2 a.m., irrespective of Mr. Nicolescu's version of the cause of that accident.
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Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a misdemeanor
violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Nicolescu was not
transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI,
rather he was transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center for treatment of the eye injury. Memorandum Decision &
Order, at 1-4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not
involving a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a
trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The
interpretation of law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free
review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
I.C.R. 54.1 ("Appeals from a magistrate to a district court - Appealable
judgments and orders." provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken to the district judge's
'division of the district court from any of the following judgments, orders or decisions
rendered by a magistrate ... (d) An order granting a motion to suppress evidence in
a misdemeanor criminal action .... "
A. Suppression

"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007).
"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. 2 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal

2

See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial court's
fmdings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.").
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determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 ,
I

Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999).
ANALYSIS

In this appeal, the state asserts that the magistrate erred when he concluded
that sufficient evidence did not exist to allow officers to administer a breath test of Mr.
Nicolescu. See Appellant's Brief, at 3.
In his decision, the magistrate concluded that "[t]aking one's breath for a
preliminary breath test is a search under the Fourth Amendment." Memorandum
Decision and Order, at 7. The magistrate also concluded that Mr. Nicolescu "was not
given the choice to submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told
that he was going to have to blow into a devicl ... In this case Nicolescu acquiesced
when he was told he was going to blow intl a device. Mere submission to lawful
authority does not equate to consent .... " /d.,lat 8-9.
The state contends "an officer does hot have to obtain specific consent to
administer a breath or blood test from a

sus~ect who has been driving." Appellant's
I

Brief, at 4. "Thus, if the preliminary breath test administered by Palic is considered an
evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho cJde § 18-8002( 1), then consent had

previously been given by the defendant when! he drove his vehicle that night, and the
magistrate court erred in holding that Nicolescu h'ad failed to give consent." /d., at 6.
The state relies on I.C. 18-8002(1) in support of its contention. That statute
does provide that "[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor

vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have! given his consent to evidentiary testing
for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have

Memorandum Decision and Order 5

000166

given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances, provided that such testing is ad~inistered at the request of a peace
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004,
Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code."
However, if this were considered as an evidentiary test, Mr. Nicolescu would
also have the right to be informed, "[a]t the time of the evidentiary testing ... that if he
refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidentiary testing" he is subject to
certain sanctions. Mr. Nicolescu was not informed of this, and since the court does
not believe that a preliminary breath test is an "evidentiary test," so it appears that
this code section cannot be relied upon to provide implied consent for Mr. Nicolescu.
Alternatively, the state argues that "the preliminary breath test is not an
-evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) but rather a roadside field
sobriety test requiring reasonable suspicion." Appellant's Brief, at 6. 3

3

Mr. Nicolescu argues that even preliminary breath tests are evidentiary tests under the Idaho Code and,
therefore, all such testing must comply with the standards in the code for such tests. See Respondent's Brief, at
16-19. The code defmes the term "evidentiary testing" as "a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests
utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in a
person . . . for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration . . . the results of any test for alcohol
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a
laboratory operated and approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state
police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness to establish
the reliability of the testing procedure for examination." I.C. § 18-8002A(l)(e). See also I.C. § 18-8002(9).
"Evidentiary testing" means a test that is conducted for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. In
other words, an evidentiary test is a test conducted for the purpose of establishing proof of the level of alcohol
concentration in a person. That is not the purpose of a preliminary breath test. A preliminary breath test is
utilized, as discussed in more detail hereinafter, like any other field sobriety test, as "a method for making a
threshold determination as to whether a person has consumed alcohol." State v. Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010). A preliminary breath test, consequently, is not an evidentiary test, as that term is described in the
Idaho Code.

Preliminary breath tests are not specifically authorized by the Idaho Code (neither are they specifically
prohibited). However, the court fmds that not to be dispositive, as none of the other field sobriety tests are also
specifically authorized by the code. They are simply investigative tools which can be utilized by police officers
in determining probable cause and are constitutionally authorized as "reasonable" searches and seizures. See
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The state relies on State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App.
1999), in support of its contentions. In that case, the court noted "[a] seizure occursand the Fourth Amendment is implicated-when an officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained a citizen's liberty. The critical
inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that
he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. When
an officer administers field sobriety tests, the driver of the vehicle is not free to ignore
the officer's request. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was implicated by the administration of field sobriety tests
in the instant case." 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705.
"A search without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements. One of the exceptions is
when the police validly stop a person to investigate possible criminal behavior, even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest ... an investigatory ... stop is
justified under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." /d.
"Field sobriety tests are, by their very definition, done in the 'field' typically on
the side of a public thoroughfare and are ordinarily performed contemporaneously
with a traffic stop . . . although Ferreira testified that he did not did not believe he
could refuse the [field test sobriety test] request, that does not elevate the detention
into a de facto arrest. In any investigative detention the individual is not free to leave;
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480, 988 P.2d at 706 ("[F]ield sobriety tests are reasonable methods of conducting an
investigation, based on specific articulable facts that a driver is operating his ... vehicle contrary to I.C. § 188004.").
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that element of compulsion is what distinguishes an investigative detention from a
consensual encounter . . . we conclude that the administration of field sobriety tests
following a traffic stop is but an investigative detention." 133 Idaho at 706, 988 P.2d
at 480.
"To determine whether a search conducted within an investigative detention is
reasonable, and, therefore, constitutionally permissible, the Court must balance the
state's interest in conducting the search against the level of intrusion into individual's
privacy that the search entails." /d. "[T]he state's interest in stopping drunk driving is
compelling, and the protection of its citizens from life-threatening danger is of
paramount concern. An individual's privacy is certainly intruded upon by the
administration of field sobriety tests. However, the state's interest is overwhelming
\

and outweighs the intrusion into a driver's privacy and, thus, we hold that field
:sobriety tests are reasonable methods of conducting an investigation, based upon
specific and articulable facts that a driver is operating his ... vehicle contrary to I. C.§
18-8004." /d.
In the Court's view, Mr. Nicolescu performed the preliminary breath test in an
investigative detention setting. "The factors to be considered in distinguishing an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the seriousness of the crime, the
location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the
officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds." /d.
"An arrest is characterized as a full-scale seizure of the person requiring probable
cause." 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705.
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Prior to performing the breath test, Mr. Nicolescu was not handcuffed. He was
not in the police station or other law enforcement setting. His suspected crime was
driving under the influence. The length of time to perform the breath test was short. In
sum, the circumstances surrounding the preliminary breath test were essentially the
same or similar to the field sobriety testing setting, except for the nature of the test
itself. See State v. Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ("[A] PBT
[preliminary breath test] is a handheld apparatus used to conduct breath tests in the
field ... PBTs are akin to general field sobriety tests and provide officers with a
simple method for making a threshold determination as to whether a person has
consumed alcohol."). See also State v. Kinney, 190 Vt. 195, 203, 27 A.3d 348 (2011)
(Johnson, J., concurring) ("Like physical field sobriety tests, such as the HGN test or
field dexterity tests, PBT results may be used as an investigative tool.").
The nature of the breath test is arguably more intrusive than field sobriety
testing, since, rather than being directed to perform a series of tests of bodily
movements, the person is directed to breathe into a handheld measuring device.
However, it also would take much less time for an individual to breathe into this
device than to undergo the full array of standard field sobriety testing.
As previously noted, the Court of Appeals has held "the state's interest in
stopping drunk driving is compelling and . . . of paramount concern." The
circumstances in this case demonstrate that it is not feasible to require the
performance of the standard field sobriety tests because it is not clear, due to the
after effects of the accident, how much of a suspect's bodily actions are the result of
intoxication or of the accident, the state's interest in stopping drunk driving outweighs

Memorandum Decision and Order 9

000170

"

.I

the suspect's privacy concerns in relation to an investigatory field breath test and this
is the least intrusive means to further the investigation. See Ferriera, 133 Idaho at
482, 988 P.2d at 708 ("The investigative methods utilized during an investigative
seizure should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."). In addition, as with other field
sobriety testing, a preliminary breath test requires reasonable suspicion and not
probable cause, for the test to be authorized. See id., 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at
707 ('"[T]he dual purposes of roadside field sobriety tests are to either confirm or
dispel the police officer's suspicion that the driving is operating his ... motor vehicle
contrary to the law."); July 2, 2012 Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 40
(Officer Palic's testimony that Mr. Nicolescu would not have been arrested if he "had
blown ... under a .08."). See a/so Ferriera, 133 Idaho at 487, 988 P.2d at 708 ("[T]he
.... Constitution requires only that a police officer possess reasonable suspicion that
a person is driving in violation of I.C. § 18-8004 before field sobriety tests may be
administered.").
Reasonable suspicion has been found to exist where an officer is aware of
driving behavior that is outside of "what can be described as normal driving behavior,"
particularly when this occurs late at night. See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). "[W]e have found probable cause where the
defendant had driven erratically, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech,
and admitted to consuming alcohol." State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,
779, 275 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012).
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Officer Palic testified that on October 15, 2011, he was dispatched to the
scene of an accident, at 2:00 in the morning. "[T]he investigating officer of the
collision had suspected that there may be a possible DUI .... "July 2, 2012 Motion to
Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 6. Upon making contact with Mr. Nicolescu, the
driver of one of the vehicles, Officer Palic "detected a very strong odor of alcoholic
beverage coming from his breath ... he was very unsteady on his feet, he had a
pretty severe sway in the stationary stance; I noted that he had red, bloodshot,
watery eyes; and he also admitted to me that he had been consuming alcohol that
night." /d., at 7.
Officer Palic said he was concerned about whether Mr. Nicolescu's
involvement in the accident would affect his ability to perform field sobriety tests. Mr.
Nicolescu told him that "he was medically cleared." /d., at 8. However, he was only
able to obtain a partial nystagmus test. He then chose not to continue with further
field sobriety testing "because it was clear to me that he had some adrenaline kicking
in from his collision; he was starting to shake. He even indicated to me that he was
very unsteady on his feet." /d., at 10.
"After he had gotten medically cleared, I made a decision to try to use a
preliminary breath test and obtain a reading to see if there was a detection of alcohol
in his system, to confirm what I'd been seeing." /d. 4

4

Mr. Nicolescu argues that the preliminary breath test results were not admissible because "Officer Palic
admitted that he did not observe the 15 minute period prior to administering the ... test." Respondent's Brief, at
15. Again, a PBT is not an evidentiary test, as that term is utilized in the Idaho Code. Rather, as previously noted,
it is another type of field sobriety test. "PBT devices are typically uncertified by the Department of Toxicology ..
. so their results tend to be inadmissible at trial." Lucas, 934 N.E.2d at 205. However, the court believes that
PBTs they are admissible in a suppression hearing context, to show that there was reasonable suspicion to
believe that the'individual was driving drunk, warranting true evidentiary testing, as occurred here. See Kinney,
190 Vt. at 203, 27 A.3d at 354 ("A preliminary breath test is not as accurate as an evidentiary breath test, which
is taken with a more sophisticated instrument ... results ofPBTs are inadmissible as evidence of impairment and
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Officer Palic knew that Mr. Nicolescu had been involved in a traffic accident
early in the morning, had a very strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and he admitted
to having been drinking. He also observed that Mr. Nicolescu was "very unsteady on
his feet ... pretty severe sway ... red, bloodshot, watery eyes .... "/d., at 7. While
Officer Palic conceded that there were "plausible ... explanations for the bloodshot,
glassy eyes and ... the lack of field sobriety tests," (id., at 22) (i.e., the after effects of
the accident), in the court's view, he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr.
Nicolescu was driving under the influence. 5 See State v. Cooper, 119 Idaho 654, 656,
809 P.2d 515, 517 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The report [the officer] received [that Cooper
was involved in a roll-over accident and an EMT on the scene "'could smell alcohol, a
fruity odor, similar to alcohol' coming from her breath or clothing"] certainly gave the
officer a 'reasonable articulable suspicion' warranting 'further investigation' into the
possibility that the driver had been drinking.").
Since Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Nicolescu was
driving under the influence, and it was not feasible to have him undergo standard field
sobriety testing, Officer Palic was authorized to direct him to submit to the preliminary
breath test, with or without his consent.

may be used to detennine whether more accurate testing is appropriate."). See also State v. Carver, 2001 WL
34094000, *I (D. Id.) ("From a review of case law, it appears to this Court that the near unanimous holdings of
Courts in other jurisdictions throughout the nation has been to limit the use of the preliminary breath testing
devices to detennining the issue of probable cause.").
5

0fficer Moore was also present that evening and he also "could smell the odor of alcoholic beverage ... he also
appeared to have ... red, bloodshot eyes. He admitted that he was involved in a ... crash, and that he was the
driver ...." Id., at 30-31.
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CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the magistrate's decision granting Mr. Nicolescu's
motion to suppress is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.

~Y'

SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS~ day of Apri12013.

Michael Mclaughlin
Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties of record in
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

SARAH A. MILLAR
BOISE CITY PROSECUTOR
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 600
PO BOX 1583
BOISE, ID 83701

Date:
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ED GUERRICABEITIA
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
ISB No. 6148
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No. _ _ _ _ __
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO AND ITS ATTORNEY
OF RECORD, BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 150 N. CAPITOL BLVD., P.O.
BOX 500, BOISE, IDAHO 83701-0500, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of

record, Ed Guerricabeitia of the law firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, appeals against the
above named Respondent, State of Idaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum
Decision and Order, entered on April16, 2013, Honorable Michael McLaughlin, presiding.
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2. That Appellant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court, and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under
and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1 0), I.A.R.
3. Appellant intends to assert the following issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding as
a matter of law that the preliminary breath test performed was not an
evidentiary test as described in the Idaho Code;

b.

Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding as
a matter of law that Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion and/or probable
cause to perform the preliminary breath test;

c.

Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in fmding as
a matter of law that the preliminary breath test performed with the AlcorSensor can be used to form the basis of the officer's reasonable suspicion
and/or probable cause to administer further evidentiary testing with the
Lifeloc.

4.

a.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.

b.

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the
reporter's transcript:
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1)

The transcript from the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
held on July 2, 2012. Said transcript has been previously prepared
at the request of the State prjor to the filing of this appeal.

2)

The transcript from the hearing on the State's appeal to the District
Court held on April3, 2013. Appellants request the preparation of
the transcript in compressed form as described in I.A.R. 26(m).

5.

The Appellant requests the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28(a)(2), I.A.R. In

addition, Appellants requests a copy of the officer's audio tapes identified as State's Exhibit 2
provided in the Stipulations to Supplement Evidence in Suppression Hearing and Augmenting
the Record on Appeal and Orders entered thereafter.
6.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript.

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d)

That there is no Appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8)).

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED this

3ttl day of May, 20~3.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

Eq~

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ((d day of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box500
Boise, lqaho 83701-0500

[vf'

Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702

[ ]

[ ]
[ ]

[vf
[ ]

Cindy Ho
Clerk to the Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
Aga County Courthouse
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Mia Martorelli
Court Reporter to the
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702

[ ]

[vf
[ ]

[ ]

[vf
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered prior to filing
Facsimile

U.S .. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered prior to filing
Facsimile

¥~/-Ed Guerricabeitia
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To:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
51 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
334-2616

NO.~:----=:::-----A.M.
00 F~-----
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JUN 11 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

STATE OF IDAHO,

By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Kevin Nicolescu,
Defendant-Appellant.

)Supreme Court No.
)40985
)Ada Case No.
)CR-MD-2011-17076
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on June 4, 2013, I
lodged a transcript 46 pages in length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court
Clerk of the County of Ada
in the Fourth Judicial
District.
HEARING DATES INCLUDED:
April 3,

2013, motion hearing+

l:
Mia J.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 40985
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant-Appellant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course ofthis action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Transcript of Motion Hearing Held July 2, 2012, Boise, Idaho, filed October 26, 2012.
2. State's Exhibit 2 (CDs 1 thru 5) attached to Order Augmenting the Record on Appeal,
filed April 16,2013.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this lith day of June, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 40985
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant-Appellant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

ED GUERRICABEITIA

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 40985
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

VS.

KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU,
Defendant-Appellant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
3rd day of May, 2013.
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